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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This article recommends the creation of an independent
adjudication agency with the exclusive jurisdiction over final
administrative decisions of Social Security Act benefits claims.
Structural independence of the administrative appellate adjudication
function from the agencies that set the policy for the Social Security
Act benefits programs is the necessary next step to ensure the timely,
high quality, impartial, and independent appellate administrative
decisions for which the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") sets
the procedural due process structure.' This new agency may be
called the United States Office of Hearings and Appeals ("USOHA").
The Social Security Administration ("SSA") sets and implements
the policy standards for entitlement to Social Security Act Title II old
1. The APA was enacted in 1946 to, among other things, achieve
reasonable uniformity and fairness of the administrative process in
the federal government for members of the American public with
claims pending before federal agencies. This includes uniform
standards for the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings, including
the merit appointment of hearing examiners who now are ALJs
[Administrative Law Judges]. The APA sets forth a due process
administrative procedure for the hearing and decision by ALJs of
cases brought before the federal agencies to which the APA
applies. The APA also provides for judicial review of final
administrative decisions by the federal agencies. Provisions in the
APA for the decisional independence of ALJs, through safeguards
against undue agency influence, include a merit selection process
administered by the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")
rather than the hiring agencies, career permanent civil service
appointments without a probationary period, pay levels set by
statute, prohibitions of performance evaluations and bonus pay,
and the requirement of a due process hearing before the Merit
Systems Protection Board before an adverse personnel action may
be taken against an ALJ.
Robin J. Arzt, Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges Pursuant to the Social
Security Act are Adjudications Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 22 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 279, 281 (Fall 2002) (citations omitted)
(referencing: U.S. Justice Dept., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 9 (1947) [hereinafter Manual]; 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5335(a)(B), 5372, 7521 (2000)).
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age, survivors and disability insurance program benefits,2 and Title
XVI supplemental security income program benefits for aged, blind
and disabled people.3 The SSA Commissioner would continue to
have the power to make only initial decisions on such Social Security
Act claims. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS") has delegated the Secretary's power to set and
implement the policy standards for entitlement to Social Security Act
Title XVIII health insurance for the aged and disabled (Medicare)
benefits to the Administrator of the DHHS Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services ("CMS"). 4  The DHHS Secretary and CMS
Administrator would continue to have the power to make only initial
decisions on the Medicare benefits claims. However, the SSA
Commissioner and DHHS Secretary would retain all authority for the
policy-making, policy-implementation, rulemaking, investigation and
prosecutorial functions respectively vested in the SSA and DHHS by
law.
The DHHS Secretary would retain initial and final administrative
jurisdiction over Medicare, Medicaid and other federal health care
enforcement proceedings brought under the Social Security Act and
other applicable statutes. Such enforcement proceedings currently
are heard on administrative appeal by Administrative Law Judges
("ALJs") within the Civil Remedies Division of the DHHS
Departmental Appeals Board, with final administrative decision-
making authority vested in the DHHS Secretary. 5  The function,
2. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620; Amendments
to Title I of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360 (amended
1939); Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807, 815
(1956) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (1994 & Supp. 1996-1999)).
3. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329,
1465-1479 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1994 & Supp.
1996-1999)).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395ff, 1395hh (2003); See generally, Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (2003)).
5. SSA's Official Internet Site for the Civil Remedies Division of the DHHS
Departmental Appeals Board, at http://www.dhhs.gov/dab/civil/ (Last visited Oct.
14, 2003). Social Security Act enforcement proceedings for civil money penalties,
assessments and exclusions from program participation are brought by CMS, the
DHHS Office of Inspector General, or SSA Office of Inspector General. The scope
of the Social Security Act civil remedies cases that may be sought by CMS or the
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organization, and authority of the Civil Remedies Division of the
DHHS Departmental Appeals Board would not be affected by the
creation of an independent adjudication agency with jurisdiction to
make the final administrative decisions of Social Security Act
benefits claims.
When an agency such as the SSA or DHHS through CMS
exclusively uses rulemaking proceedings to set policy, rather than
also using adjudications to set policy, there no longer is any rationale
for keeping the adjudicatory function within the agency. The
Congressional interest in providing a check on SSA's and DHHS'
enforcement powers (i.e., to withhold disability, Medicare, and other
program benefits) is best served by having benefits entitlement
determinations decided by an independent adjudicatory agency based
on the benefits entitlement standards set by SSA or DHHS through
CMS.
An independent adjudication agency would provide members of
the American public who file claims for Social Security Act
entitlement program benefits denied by the SSA or DHHS through
CMS timely adjudications that give due process and a sense of a fair
hearing free of political and policy implementation pressure. This
proposal recommends amendments of the Social Security Act (1) to
provide the claimants with timely, high quality, impartial and fair
decisions of their claims pursuant to the APA by adjudicators who
are in an agency independent of, but within, the SSA, and (2) to
ensure that the adjudication process complies with the APA.
In part II, the current Social Security and Medicare claims
procedures briefly are described.6
Part III describes in detail the reasons why separation of the
administrative adjudication function from SSA and DHHS is
imperative, particularly in view of (1) the recent actions by the
DHHS through CMS to avoid the use of the APA ALJ due process
DHHS or SSA Offices of the Inspector General, jurisdiction over the appeals from
which is vested in the ALJs within the Civil Penalties Division, is stated in 20
C.F.R. § 498.100 (2003), 42 C.F.R. §§ 402.1, 1003.100, 1005.2(a) (2003), 20
C.F.R. Part 498, and 42 C.F.R Parts 498, 1001, 1003, and 1004 (2003). The ALJs
within the Civil Penalties Division also have jurisdiction over civil remedies case
appeals for violations of statutes other than the Social Security Act, which are listed
at http://www.dhhs.gov/dab/appellatee/regulations.html.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
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procedure altogether 7 and (2) the SSA's long history of policy and
management interference with the ALJs' decisional independence,
and the inability of SSA to administer the disability programs in an
effective and efficient manner. The CMS' recent steps to avoid using
the APA AU due process procedure and the SSA's difficulties in
implementing its current disability program initiatives, including
process unification, prototype, the Hearing Process Improvement
Plan, and the Appeals Council Process Improvement Plan, are
thoroughly described in Part III. In part HI(C), the SSA
Commissioner's September 2003 proposal to replace the Appeals
Council with a panel process within SSA OHA that is staffed by
ALJs and non-APA administrative appeals judges from the Appeals
Council is discussed. The Commissioner's proposal borrows from
the author's proposal for local appellate panels of three ALJs akin to
the Bankruptcy Court appellate panel process to replace the Appeals
Council that is part of the author's 2001 detailed proposal for a new
independent adjudication agency to make the final administrative
adjudications of Social Security Act benefits claims that is the basis
for this article. Modifications of the Commissioner's proposal are
recommended to include the elements of the Bankruptcy Court
appellate panel process described in this article that have made that
process a demonstrated success. 8
That the preservation of the application of the APA to Social
Security Act adjudications is essential to preserve due process and
fairness for the Social Security benefits claimants and Medicare
beneficiaries and providers is discussed in part IV. 9
Part V explains that a court model cannot be used for appellate
administrative adjudications pursuant to the APA because the APA
expressly does not apply to courts, including Article I and II court
models. 10
7. Such actions include entry into contracts with the state social services
agencies in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York to arbitrate Medicare
appeals, and the CMS Administrator's statements and plans during early 2002 to
have Medicare appeals heard by non-APA administrative judges.
8. See discussion infra Part III. The discussion of the Commissioner's
proposed panel process is discussed at Part III(C), infra text accompanying notes
143-152. Also see, supra first unnumbered note.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See discussion infra Part V.
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A model for an independent agency for Social Security Act
adjudications in the independent Commission format is discussed in
part VI. Part VI posits that it is difficult to justify a "role" for
politically appointed Commissioners, since the independent entity
would not set policy. Policy-setting is the function for which
political accountability is desirable." Hence the proposal in parts
VII and VIII that the independent agency be an adjudicatory body
that is self-administered by the ALJs with a right of appeal from an
individuals AU's decision to an appellate panel staffed by ALJs. 12
Part VII describes why an independent adjudication agency
administered by ALJs provides a higher quality of judicial
independence and due process for Social Security benefits claimants
and Medicare beneficiaries and providers than an independent but
politically appointed commission structure. There are several
reasons why this is so. First is the elimination of political oversight
by appointees (i.e., Commissioners) who do not have adjudicative
independence as their foremost goal in agency administration.
Second, a small body, such as a Commission, the current SSA
Appeals Council, or the Medicare Appeals Council of the DHHS
Departmental Appeals Board, cannot be of sufficient size to do
meaningful administrative review of appeals from the AU decisions,
which now number over 100,000 per year. The SSA ALJs are a large
group of highly qualified judicial professionals who are capable of
administering themselves and the appellate administrative process in
a competent and effective manner. There currently are no DHHS
AUs who decide Medicare benefit claims.' 3  Finally, if the SSA
ALJs administer themselves, they will draft and issue the procedural
regulations and rules of the new agency based upon their experience
and needs of the process, rather than expediency and other policy
concerns as they are now. There now is no coherent set of procedural
11. See discussion infra Part VI.
12. See discussion infra Parts VII and VIII.
13. The ALJ function of hearing and deciding Medicare benefits claims will be
transferred from SSA and its Commissioner to the DHHS and its Secretary on a
date during July 1-October 1, 2005. MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066, § 931(b)(1).
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regulations and rules for the SSA or Medicare appellate
administrative process. 14
Part VIII states in detail the proposals and rationales for the
features of the USOHA, which would be an ALJ-administered
independent adjudication agency with a right of appeal from an
individual AU's decision to an appellate panel staffed by ALJs. 15
The independent agency would be within the SSA, but its officers
and employees would not be supervised by any other part of SSA.
The USOHA will be accountable only to the President and Congress.
Placing the USOHA within SSA results in no new costs for office
space and information systems and is a practical necessity, given the
USOHA's substantial space needs that currently are in place at SSA,
the need to share the SSA's information services and data bases, and
the need to use the same case files.
16
The USOHA would have the exclusive jurisdiction to make the
final administrative decisions of Social Security Act Titles II, XVI
and XVIII benefits claims. The USOHA would have permissive
jurisdiction over other classes of cases, so it may hear and decide
other classes of cases such as those that the SSA ALJs have heard in
the past. The final administrative adjudication authority of SSA and
DHHS would be abolished, including the SSA Appeals Council and
DHHS Medicare Appeals Council. However, as is stated above, the
SSA and DHHS would retain all authority for all of the policy-
making, policy-implementation, rulemaking, investigation and
prosecutorial functions respectively vested in the SSA and DHHS by
law.17
An individual AU's decision would be appealed to appellate
panel staffed by ALJs, which would consist of three ALJs who would
review the cases locally. The AU appellate panels would be akin to
the United States Bankruptcy Court appellate panels. The ALJ
appellate panels is one of the key features that make the AU self-
administration model superior to the current SSA Appeals Council
and DHHS Medicare Appeals Council model or a Commission.
Based upon the Bankruptcy Court experience, the appellate panel
14. See discussion infra Part VII.
15. See discussion infra Part VIII.
16. See discussion infra Part VIII(B).
17. See discussion infra Part VIII(D).
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model (1) is an appellate system that can handle a large caseload, (2)
results in higher quality decisions because of expertise, (3) results in
substantially fewer appeals to the courts and a substantially lower
reversal rate by the courts because of the bar's and courts' confidence
in the high quality of the decisions, which reflects a higher degree of
decision accuracy from three expert decisionmakers working
together, (4) results in a substantially reduced federal court caseload,
(5) results in a shorter disposition time because the large pool of
about 1,000 AUs permits the timely determination of appeals that
cannot take place with a small body such as the SSA Appeals
Council or a Commission, and (6) affords the claimants access to a
local appellate process, among other things. 
18
The final decisions of the USOHA would be appealable only to
the federal courts, with the District Courts as the first step in the
judicial review. 19
A Chief Administrative Law Judge would be appointed by the
President from the ranks of the ALJs. The Chief Judge and five
Deputy Chief Judges would administer the USOHA from a single
national headquarters. The ten OHA regional offices and the position
of Regional Chief AU would be abolished so that only one set of
support staff and administrative offices, instead of eleven, would
exist. A centralized structure also would eliminate inconsistencies in
administration and carrying out policy, which has been a problem
with the OHA regional offices. Also, having one central office
would create a more efficient organization, in view of instant modem
electronic communications. 20
The USOHA would set its own rules of practice and procedure
and the AUs would administer the agency.2 1
Exemption of the USOHA from the statutory discretionary
spending caps for its administrative costs is recommended to ensure
high quality service, since the USOHA would not have control over
the size of its caseload.22
18. See discussion infra Part VIII(E).
19. See discussion infra Part VIII(G).
20. See discussion infra Part VIII(H)-(I).
21. See discussion infra Part VIII(K).
22. See discussion infra Part VIII(M).
276 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
A substantial amount of funds would be saved annually by the
abolishment of the SSA Appeals Council and the ten OHA regional
offices, which appear to be on the order of in excess of $75,000,000.
Additional funds would be saved annually by the abolishment of the
DHHS Medicare Appeals Council. The appellate panel work would
increase the workload of the ALJs and, thus, additional ALJs likely
will be required and additional travel and other administrative costs
incurred. However, the cost for the appellate panels, which can meet
in already established local facilities, likely will be less than the cost
of the abolished OHA regional offices, DHHS Medicare Appeals
Council, and SSA Appeals Council, with its staff of twenty-seven
Administrative Appeals Judges ("AAJs") and over 800 support
personnel and substantial facilities in the OHA headquarters. The
SSA Fiscal Year 2000 Performance and Accountability Report
reflects that the cost of the Appeals Council process apparently was
$64,671,200 in fiscal year 2000. Thus, unlike the Bankruptcy Court
Appellate Panel Service, which was a new creation in addition to the
District Court review step that already was available, the Social
Security Appellate Panel Service would replace a failed appellate
review step that already exists and is funded. The staff and facilities
for the ten OHA regional offices were estimated to cost about
$13,000,000 annually in 1993 by the Congressional Budget Office,
which likely is a greater figure now. 23
The recommendations in this article pertain only to the appellate
administrative adjudication process that results in a final
administrative decision of the claimants' entitlement to benefits,
since that is where the problems lie. No substantive changes in the
process of judicial review after the final administrative decision have
been recommended, other than to amend the Social Security Act to
reflect that judicial review will be from the final decisions of the new
agency, not the SSA and DHHS.24
II. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS CLAIMS PROCEDURE
In 1994, the Social Security Administration became a
Congressionally-created independent regulatory single commissioner
23. See discussion infra Part VIII(I).
24. See discussion infra Part VIII(G).
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agency. The appellate adjudicatory function, namely the
administrative review of the SSA's initial determinations of Social
Security Act claims that were partially or wholly denied by the state
Disability Determinations Services agencies ("DDS") on behalf of
the SSA, takes place within the Office of Hearings and Appeals
("OHA") of SSA. OHA is administered by layers of management.
There is an Associate Commissioner for OHA, who is a Senior
Executive Service level manager. The Associate Commissioner
reports to the Deputy Commissioner of Disability and Income
Security Programs, who is one of eight Deputy Commissioners who
report to the Commissioner of SSA.26
There are two primary organizational components of OHA. The
first level of administrative appeal is handled within Hearing
Operations, where a claimant is afforded an opportunity for a de novo
hearing and decision by an AU. AUs are Article II executive
branch competitive civil service employees who are hired pursuant to
section 3501 of the APA through a Title 5 OPM civil service
examination process. The Chief AU oversees 140 hearing offices
and ten regional offices, and is described by SSA as the "principal
consultant and advisor to the Associate Commissioner on all matters
concerning the AU hearing process and all field operations."27 The
Chief AU reports to the Associate Commissioner for OHA. There
are over 1,100 AUs and about 5,600 support staff. SSA AUs issue
over 500,000 decisions per year. The second and final level of
administrative appeal is handled within the Office of Appellate
Operations, where a claimant is afforded an opportunity for a record
review of the AU's decision by the Appeals Council. The Office of
Appellate Operations has about 800 employees and decided over
101,000 cases in fiscal year 2002. OHA also has a Program
Management unit, which makes policy and sets procedures for OHA,
including policy for the processing of cases through OHA, and an
Administrative Management unit, which provides administrative
25. Social Security Administration Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296,
108 Stat. 1472 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 901 (a)-(b) (West 2003)).
26. SSA's Official Internet Site available at http://www.ssa.gov/org (Last
visited Oct. 14, 2003).
27. See SSA's Official Internet Site available at
http://www.ssa.gov/ohalabnet-oha.html.
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support for OHA.28 The Associate Commissioner of OHA is the
chair of the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council consists of AAJs
who are not ALJs selected by the civil service procedure established
by the APA. They are career civil servants who are required to be
attorneys with a certain level of experience. 29  Essentially, OHA
performs an adjudicatory function in an executive agency created by
the legislature.
The first level of appellate administrative review of DHHS initial
determinations of Medicare claims that are partially or wholly denied
by the Intermediaries on behalf of CMS also takes place within the
OHA of SSA, based upon a contractual arrangement between CMS
and SSA. 30 Beneficiaries and providers are afforded an opportunity
for a de novo hearing and decision by an SSA ALJ.31 However, the
ALJ function of hearing and deciding Medicare benefits claims will
be transferred from SSA and its Commissioner to the DHHS and its
Secretary on a date during July 1-October 1, 2005.32
The final appellate administrative review step by which a
beneficiary or provider is afforded an opportunity for a record review
of the AL' s decision takes place before the Medicare Appeals
Council of the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board.33 The DHHS
Departmental Appeals Board has over seventy employees, including
the Chair and four other members of the Board, eight ALJs employed
in the Board's Civil Remedies Division, and four administrative
appeals judges employed by the Board's Medicare Appeals Council.
The Medicare Appeals administrative appeals judges are not APA
28. SSA's Official Internet Site for the Office of Hearings and Appeals, About
SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals; Information on OHA's Hearing Sites,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/oha (Last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
29. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A
Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals
Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. .L. REV. 199, 236-240 (1990).
30. SSA's Official Internet Site for the Medicare Appeals Council of the
DHHS Departmental Appeals Board, available at
http;//www.dhhs.gov/dab/MOD2002.html (Last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
31.42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A) (2003).
32. MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION, DRUG, IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
ACT OF2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, § 931(b)(1).
33. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.80-498.95 (2003).
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ALJs.
34
1II. REASONS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY TO MAKE
FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
BENEFITS CLAIMS
A. Rationales for Independent Adjudication Agencies
There is an inherent, and often real, conflict between (1) the need
for independent and impartial appellate administrative
decisionmakers and decisions, and (2) Executive Branch agency
policymakers' desire to control the decisionmakers and the outcome
of their decisions to conform to policy and political concerns. This
conflict results in agency policymakers' intrusions into the
administrative adjudication function.
Many of the same rationales that justify Congress' creation of
specialized independent Article I courts to perform the initial judicial
review of final administrative decisions by Executive Branch
agencies also support the separation of the appellate administrative
adjudication function from Executive Branch agencies. This is done
to promote decisional independence from the agencies'
policymaking/rulemaking, prosecutorial/enforcement and
investigatory functions.
Examples of such specialized courts include the Tax Court,
35
which hears appeals from IRS tax decisions, and the Veterans
Appeals Court, 36 which hears appeals of benefits decisions by the
Department of Veterans Affairs. The most important rationale for
these independent courts is the experience that effective protection of
individual rights before agencies through independent
decisionmaking cannot take place unless adjudications are separated
from the agency policy and enforcement functions. Congress created
the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924 to provide an independent tribunal
to hear taxpayers' appeals from tax deficiency notices before
34. SSA's Official Internet Site for the Medicare Appeals Council of the
DHHS Departmental Appeals Board, available at
http://www.dhhs.gov/dab/background.html (Last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
35. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2002).
36. 38 U.S.C. § 4051 (2002).
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payment of the tax after a Congressionally created board studied the
IRS appellate review practices and concluded that
[I]t would never be possible to give to the taxpayer the
fair and independent review to which he is of right
entitled as long as the appellate tribunal is directly
under, and its recommendations subject to the
approval of, the officer whose duty it is to administer
the law and collect the tax. As long as the appellate
tribunal is part and parcel of the collecting machinery
it can hardly maintain the attitude essential to a
judicial tribunal.37
Other reasons for creating independent adjudication agencies, in
addition to judicial independence, include expertise, efficiency, low
cost to the claimant, and high case volumes: (1) Specialized tribunals
are more likely to make correct decisions in subject areas that are
legally complex or have technical facts. (2) The maintenance of a
reasonably efficient, orderly and low cost adjudication system in the
traditional domain of public rights is in the public's interest,
especially for programs that distribute benefits on a large scale, since
litigating administrative claims in the Article III courts would take
much longer from procedural complexities that would burden
members of the public who least can afford high litigation costs. (3)
The large increase in the administrative case volume supports the use
of specialized tribunals to prevent the growth of the case volume of
the generalist Article III courts to the point where decision quality
and uniformity deteriorates. (4) Executive Branch adjudications can
result in fairer and more consistent decisions than those by the
Article III courts, given academic commentators' observations that
judicial decisions regarding whether a person is disabled under the
Social Security Act tend to be less consistent and equitable than those
based on regulations with statistical standards. 38 (5) Finally, when an
37. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1112 n.9, 111 8 -1119 (1990) (quoting, Report of
Tax Simplification Board: Hearing on H.R. REP. No. 68-103, at 4 (1st Sess. 1923).
38. Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh
Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1052-1057 (1999); Christopher B. McNeil,
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agency no longer formulates policy through its adjudication function
but does so only through rulemaking, which is the case for SSA and
CMS, supervision of the appellate administrative adjudicators and
review of their decisions by policy-making political appointees has
no reason to continue. At that point, there is no reason to keep the
adjudicatory function within the agency.39
These rationales, particularly the need to separate the
adjudicatory function from other conflicting agency functions, led
Congress to create the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission ("OSHRC") in 1970,40 and the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission ("FMSHRC") in 19774' as independent,
Executive Branch agencies outside the Department of Labor with
only adjudicative authority. OSHRC determines whether regulations
promulgated and enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration have been violated. FMSHRC adjudicates violations
of standards promulgated and enforced by the Mine Safety and
Health Administration. 42
Two Executive Branch agencies that Congress formed as boards
with primarily adjudicative duties include the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), which reviews adverse personnel actions
by federal agencies against federal employees, 43 and the National
Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB"), which reviews a portion of
the license revocation actions by the Secretary of the Transportation
Department and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.44 However,
these two boards have some powers beyond adjudication. MSPB
does studies of the civil service and recommends legislation to
Congress and the President and the NTSB investigates accidents and
recommends safety improvement measures.
45
Executive Branch, 18 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 16 (1998); Revesz,
supra note 37, at 1117-18, 1120-22; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, andArticle III, 101 HARv. L. REV. 916, 935-937 (1988).
39. See discussion infra Part VI.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (2001).
41. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (2001).
42. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1119, 1135-36.
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (2001).
44. 49 U.S.C. § 903(a)(9) (2001).
45. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1135 n.122.
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The DHHS and SSA are ripe for separation of the appellate
administrative adjudication function from the agencies.
B. The Need to Separate the Appellate Administrative Adjudication
Function from the Department of Health and Human Services,
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
During 2002 and early 2003, DHHS and CMS took steps to avoid
using the APA AU due process procedure for the Medicare
administrative appeals process at the same time that DHHS planned
the transfer of the AU function in the Medicare appeals process from
SSA to CMS. Any plan to deny Medicare beneficiaries and
providers the right to a full due process hearing under the APA
before an ALJ would have resulted in a denial of basic procedural
due process rights to the American people. Without APA due
process, Medicare beneficiaries and providers would have had no
recourse to an independent decisionmaker during the administrative
process. Also, the DHHS plan to have the AU process be a part of
CMS, the entity that makes the initial determinations of Medicare
benefits claims, lacked any structural separation of the policymaking
and adjudication functions. Fortunately, the steps to avoid the APA
AL due process procedure and to place the AU process within CMS
were not successful, as is explained in this subpart.
The CMS Medicare Appeals Reform item in the President's
proposed Budget for the United States Government for Fiscal Year
2004, issued in February 2003, states that CMS requires $129 million
to assume the "adjudicative function currently performed by
Administrative Law Judges at the Social Security Administration
[that] would be transferred to CMS. In addition, the Administration
proposed several legislative changes to the Medicare appeals process
that would give CMS flexibility to reform the appeals system. 4 6
However, one of the legislative proposals in the Appendix to the
2004 President's Budget regarding the CMS Medicare Appeals
Reform item would authorize the Secretary of the DHHS to "use
alternate mechanisms in lieu of Administrative Law Judge review"
46. 2004 President's Budget for the United States Government for Fiscal Year
2004, section on CMS Program Management, 125 (2003).
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for processing Medicare appeals under Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act.47
Thus, the Administration was positing a transfer of the ALJ
function for Medicare appeals into the very unit of DHHS that is
responsible for making and implementing policy for the Medicare
program, CMS, apparently only to permit CMS and the DHHS
Secretary to change the process to deny beneficiaries and providers
access to ALJs, the only independent decisionmakers in the
administrative appeals process. The 2004 CMS Medicare Appeals
Reform budget item was a stealth attack on the American public's
due process rights to an appellate administrative hearing and decision
by an AJ appointed pursuant to the APA after a denial of Medicare
benefits by the CMS.
The 2004 CMS Medicare Appeals Reform budget item was based
upon the CMS Budget Summary for Fiscal Year 2004 that was
submitted to the White House in late 2002 to request $126 million
from the 2004 President's Budget "to implement Medicare appeals
reforms, including... the transfer of the Medicare hearings function
from the [SSA]." 48 In the same document, CMS states twice, in the
Budget Summary and Supporting Information sections, that "[d]ue to
the current moratorium on hiring new AUs, CMS has requested the
authority to use administrative mechanisms other than ALJs, such as
hearing officers, to conduct these hearings.
49
CMS Administrator Thomas Scully said that "[t]he President's
FY2004 budget includes provisions to implement Medicare appeals
reform," when he testified before the Subcommittee on Health of the
House Committee on Ways and Means at the February 13, 2003,
Hearing on Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform. He also
testified that CMS is "proceeding toward the transfer to CMS of the
Medicare hearing function currently performed by the Administrative
Law Judges (AU) in the Social Security Administration (SSA). We
have already had extensive discussions with SSA to explore
administratively transferring the Medicare hearing function to
47. 2004 President's Budget for the United States Government for Fiscal Year
2004 - Appendix, section on CMS Program Management, 422 (2003).
48. CMS Budget Summary for Fiscal Year 2004, 1-8.
49. CMS Budget Summary for Fiscal Year 2004, 1-8, and Supporting
Information Medicare Hearings Workload page.
284 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
CMS.'50
However, the CMS Administrator did not inform the
Subcommittee that the Medicare Appeals Reform item buried in the
Appendix of the President's proposed 2004 Budget would permit
CMS to take away the Medicare beneficiaries' and providers' due
process rights under the Social Security Act and APA to a hearing
and decision on appeal before an APA AU.5'
The CMS Administrator also did not tell the Subcommittee that,
on October 22, 2002, he signed an agreement with the Connecticut
Department of Social Services to test a two-step non-APA Medicare
administrative appeals process for "dual eligible" beneficiaries that
provides a review of an appealed Intermediary's reconsidered
determination by only an unspecified CMS official followed by a
private sector arbitration as the final administrative step.52 The CMS
Administrator also did not mention that he signed a similar
agreement with the Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance on
November 4, 2002, and reportedly was negotiating such an
agreement in New York.53 The New York Agreement was signed
during early July 2003. 54 CMS' stated reliance in the agreements
upon 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1 as authority to test a change in the
appellate process is questionable. This section authorizes the DHHS
to conduct "demonstration projects" only to test cost saving
techniques in specified processes, not changes in administrative
50. Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Health of House Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2003) (statement of Thomas A. Scully, CMS Administrator).
51. Id.
52. Id.; Demonstration of HHA Settlement for Dual Eligibles Agreement,
signed by Thomas A. Scully, CMS Administrator, on October 22, 2002, and
Michael Starkowski, Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut Dept. of Social Services,
on October 23, 2002 (Connecticut Agreement) (on file with author).
53. Demonstration of HHA Settlement for Dual Eligibles Agreement, signed
by Thomas A. Scully, CMS Administrator, on November 4, 2002, and Wendy E.
Warring, Commissioner, Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance, in
November, 2002 (Massachusetts Agreement); E-mail from Erin Kuhls, Director,
Medicare Part A Analysis Group of CMS Office of Legislation, to the author (April
11, 2003) (on file with author).
54. E-mail from Chandra Branham, CMS Office of Legislation, to the author
and Erin Kuhls, Director, Medicare Part A Analysis Group of CMS Office of
Legislation (July 15, 2003) (on file with author).
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appellate due process. 55 There also is a question as to whether it is
lawful for the federal government to permit private binding
arbitration to supplant federal sovereignty by privately resolving
disputes involving rights to public benefits without access to the due
process of law and equal protection in a public forum.
56
Also, the proposed regulations published by CMS Administrator
Scully in November 2002 entitled "Changes to the Medicare Claims
Appeal Procedures" included a note that the Medicare appeals
function now performed by SSA ALJs is expected to be transferred
back to DHHS by October 1, 2003. Although proposed regulations
are published by federal agencies pursuant to the APA to inform the
public in advance of agencies' contemplated actions, nothing is said
to the public in the proposed Medicare regulations that suggests CMS
is contemplating a non-APA ALJ appeals process for Medicare
beneficiaries and providers.
57
On March 16, 2003, the New York Times published a front page
article entitled "Bush Pushes Plan to Curb Medicare Appeals" that
describes the CMS Medicare Appeals Reform item in the President's
2004 Budget and the Connecticut arbitration agreement, among other
limitations on Medicare appeals rights that the Administration was
proposing.
58
Shortly after the Times article, CMS Administrator Scully made
public statements that CMS was considering using non-APA
administrative judges to hear and decide Medicare appeals. The
CMS Administrator justified the change based on an inability to hire
ALJs, despite a February 2003 order by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit that resulted in an ended of the stay
of hiring ALJs that had been in place for years. 59 First, in reaction to
55. Connecticut Agreement, supra note 52, at 1; Massachusetts Agreement,
supra note 53, at 1.
56. My article regarding this issue is forthcoming.
57. Medicare Program Changes to Claims and Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. 69182
(proposed November 15, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405).
58. Robert Pear, Bush Pushes Plan to Curb Medicare Appeals, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2003, at A1, A30).
59. On February 20, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit rendered a final decision in Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., that reversed a
United States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) decision that included a
stay order that prevented the United States Office of Personnel Management
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the Times article, the CMS Administrator issued an e-mail statement
to the entire CMS staff in which he stated that "[a]s one option, CMS
has suggested hiring Administrative Judges (not ALJs) as a
technicality to avoid the moratorium on hiring ALJs. If anyone has a
better idea, I would love to hear that as well?? [sic]" 60
Thereafter, on March 20, 2003, CMS Administrator Scully
published an op-ed article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution in
which he stated that "the administration has examined the hiring of
"administrative judges," not administrative law judges -- a
technicality that would allow us to begin implementing what
Congress passed three years ago to improve the processes to ensure
that beneficiaries and providers can resolve their appeals faster."
There is no express reference to the defunct AU hiring stay in the
op-ed article. 61 The day before the op-ed article was published, a
spokesperson for the CMS Administrator offered a clarification of
(OPM) from issuing any ALI certificates to the Federal agencies for the hiring of
new ALJs pending the resolution of candidate scoring issues. 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), pet. for reh'g. en banc den., 2003 U.S. APP. LEXIS 14588 (Fed. Cir.
July 3, 2003). On July 23, 2003, the Federal Circuit issued a mandate that ended
the MSPB stay, even though the Federal Circuit had overturned the MSPB decision
that included the stay in February 2003 and had not granted injunctive relief
pending the final determination of the appeal. Effective August 25, 2003, OPM
lifted the suspension on the ALJ examination that was in effect since June 11,
1999. OPM also has announced that it will complete processing the applications
that were received on or before June 18, 1999, and reactivate the existing register
of ALI candidates without yet accepting new applications. See OPM vacancy
announcement for ALJs available at http://jobsearch.usajobs.opm.gov. On August
26, 2003, The Director of the OPM Washington Services Branch sent a letter to the
Chief ALJs of the various agencies that states "OPM is now able to accept and
respond to an agency's request for certificates of eligibles for vacant ALI
positions." See e.g., Letter from Deborah Grade, Director of OPM Washington
Services Branch, to Curtis L. Wagner, Chief ALJ, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (August 26, 2003) (on file with author). Accordingly, there no longer
is a barrier to the agencies hiring ALJs. If the only reason the CMS Administrator
had for wanting to use non-ALJs to hear and decide Medicare appeals was the ALI
hiring stay, rather than a desire to assert control over the decisionmakers and the
outcome of their decisions, it is reasonable to expect that he no longer will suggest
using non-ALl decisionmakers for Medicare Appeals.
60. E-mail from Thomas A. Scully, CMS Administrator, to the CMS staff
(March 16, 2003) (on file with author).
61. Thomas A. Scully, Streamline Process for Handling Medicare Appeals,
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Mar. 20, 2003, at Op. Ed.
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the CMS "moves to lessen AU hearing backlogs" by stating that
"CMS is attempting to alleviate the backlog of cases pending with its
administrative law judges (ALJs) by promoting the concept of
'administrative judges,' defined as HHS hearing officers or lawyers,
to hear some of the cases. ALJs currently have an average backlog of
four hundred days per case." 62  The CMS spokesperson also
responded to the Times article with a denial that CMS "is attempting
to limit the scope or independence of ALJs." 63 Such hearing officers
and attorneys would be subject to performance reviews and
supervision by CMS management regarding the substance and
outcome of their hearings and decisions, and to employment
termination without the agency needing to show cause before the
Merit Systems Protection Board, since they lack the APA protections
of decisional independence that is provided to ALJs.
With the CMS plans for the Medicare Appeals process now
nationally public, the CMS Administrator plainly testified before a
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on April 3,
2003, regarding the 2004 CMS Medicare Appeals Reform budget
item that (1) SSA and CMS have agreed in principle that CMS will
"assume responsibility for the Medicare hearings function effective
October 1, 2003," (2) "[w]e believe that the Medicare hearing
function is more appropriately housed within CMS, and we are
moving forward to achieve this," and (3) "[w]e are considering
alternative approaches, including the possibility of using mechanisms
other than ALJs . . . Despite a recent court ruling lifting the
moratorium, it is unclear ... when agencies will again be able to hire
ALJs... Our budget seeks a way around this problem by including
appropriation language that, if enacted, will give the Secretary the
option to consider other approaches."
64
The SSA Commissioner confirmed that the transfer of function
was expected to take place on October 1, 2003, when she testified
62. CCH NetNews, Medicare and Health Highlights (Mar. 2003) (quoting
CCH Washington Bureau (March 19, 2003)) available at http://hr.cch.com.
63. Id.
64. Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2004 President's Budget Request for CMS
Before the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education, and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations,
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (statement of Thomas A. Scully, CMS
Administrator).
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before the same subcommittee on March 4, 2003, regarding the
Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriations Requests for SSA
Beginning with FY 2004, consistent with the
Administration's plan to transfer the Medicare
hearings function to the [DHHS], SSA's annual
budget request does not include the resources that
would be needed to process Medicare hearings. The
President's budget now includes the Medicare
hearings function under the [DHHS], which is
accountable by law for management and
administration of the Medicare program.65
Shortly after the Times article was reprinted and its contents
became a topic of editorial commentary around the country, 66 and
after CMS Administrator Scully made his statements regarding the
Medicare appeals process, Members of Congress added language to
various bills that were pending about the transfer of the Medicare
appeals function now performed by SSA ALJs back to the DHHS
Secretary that reflected a recognition by Congress of the importance
of separating the adjudication function of an agency from its
policymaking functions. As is described in the remainder of this
subpart, the language added to the bills, including the one that was
enacted, demonstrated a consensus in Congress that ALJs must hear
and decide Medicare appeals and must be in a DHHS administrative
unit that is organizationally and functionally separate from CMS and
its contractors.
65. Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriation Requests for SSA Before
the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations,
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (statement of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, SSA
Commissioner).
66. See, e.g. Kathleen O'Connor, Editorial, Medicare Appeal Process Should
not be Weakened, SEATTLE TIMES, May 7, 2003, at Al; Editorial, Medicare
Appeals; Seniors Need Right to Contest Decisions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
March 24, 2003, 14A; Editorial, Tilt! Medicare Looks to Rig Appeals System in its
Favor, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, March 20, 2003. See generally Pear, supra note
58 (excerpted and reprinted in several national news publications, including the
eseret News, Houston Chronicle, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Orlando Sentinel,
San Diego Union-Tribune, and Seattle Times).
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On April 11, 2003, the House Committee on Ways and Means
amended the section of the Medicare Regulatory and Contracting
Reform Act of 2003 that addresses the transfer of responsibility for
Medicare appeals 67 to provide that the ALJs will be placed by the
DHHS Secretary "in an administrative office that is organizationally
and functionally separate from [the CMS] and its contractors." The
Committee also amended this section to require that ALJs report to
and be supervised by only the DHHS Secretary or his immediate
subordinate upon the Secretary's delegation of authority.68 These
steps are required expressly to assure AU independence in hearing
and deciding Medicare appeals. 69 On April 29, 2003, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce identically amended the same
subsection, with the except that ALJs will report to and be supervised
by only the DHHS Secretary. 70 The version of the bill that was
reported to the House on April 29, 2003, included the Energy and
Commerce Committee's version of the section that required the ALJs
to have administrative separation from CMS and its contractors and
report only to the DHHS Secretary.7'
On May 22, 2003, the Fair and Impartial Rights (FAIR) for
Medicare Act of 2003 was introduced in the Senate by Senator
Debbie Stabenow. FAIR would not only require the ALJs who
decide Medicare appeals to have administrative separation from CMS
within DHHS and report only to the DHHS Secretary, but also would
(1) require the use of ALJs appointed pursuant to the APA to hear
and decide Medicare appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff, and (2) bind
the AUs only by the applicable statutes and regulations and rulings
that are publicly promulgated as per the APA.72
67. MEDICARE REGULATORY AND CONTRACTING REFORM ACT OF 2003, H.R.
810, 108th Cong. § 401 (1st Sess. 2003).
68. Id.
69. H.R. REP. No. 108-074, pt. 1, § 401(b)(2) (2003). This subsection is
entitled Assuring Independence of Judges.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 108-074, pt. 2, § 401(b)(2) (2003).
71. H.R. 810, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 401(b)(2) (2003).
72. FAIR AND IMPARTIAL RIGHTS FOR MEDICARE ACT OF 2003, S. 1127, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). The bill had 13 co-sponsors in the Senate. See
Cosponsors Report, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SNO1 127: @ @ @P.
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Many of the provisions of the Medicare Regulatory and
Contracting Reform Act of 2003, including the section that addresses
the transfer of responsibility for Medicare appeals from SSA to
DHHS, were carried over to the Medicare Prescription Drug and
Modernization Act of 2003 that was introduced in the House as H.R.
1 and Senate as S. 1 in June 2003 and passed shortly thereafter by
both.73 The Senate version of the Medicare appeals transfer section
required steps to be taken to ensure ALJ independence, including
administrative separation of ALJs from CMS and the Center for
Medicare Choices.74  However, no reference to administrative
independence from CMS' contractors was made, and to whom the
ALJs would report was not specified.75
The provision in the House version of the Medicare appeals
transfer section regarding the assurance of ALJ independence was
identical to the strong provision in H.R. 810 that was reported to the
House: the ALJs are required to have administrative separation from
CMS and its contractors and report only to the DHHS Secretary.76
On July 7, 2003, after passage of the House version of the bill in the
Senate, the Senate version of the bill was incorporated into the House
version as a Senate amendment, the Senate requested that the bill and
Senate amendments be conferenced, and the Senate appointed Senate
conferees.77 Upon the House rejection of the Senate amendments on
July 14, 2003, the Speaker appointed House conferees to consider the
bill and Senate amendments.78
73. H.R. 1, § 931, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), H.R. 2473, § 931, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); S. 1, § 511, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). H.R. 2473 is an
earlier version of H.R. 1.
74. S. 1 §511.
75. S. 1, § 51 l(a)(2)(H).
76. H.R. 1, § 931(b)(2).
77. H.R. 1, 108th Cong. (2003), Bill Summary and Status Report for H.R. 1,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 108 :HROOOO1: @ @ @S.
78. H.R. 1, 108th Cong. (2003), Bill Summary and Status Report, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HROOOO1:@@@S. On July 24,
2003, the conferees reported that they had reached an agreement on the regulatory
and contracting reform portion of the bill, which includes the Medicare appeals
transfer section, 931. The conferees' press release through the House Ways and
Means Committee stated that the agreed upon provision "strengthens the
independence of reviewers in the appeals process". Press Release, House
Committee on Ways and Means, Medicare Conferees Reach Bipartisan Agreement
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The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, became law on December 8,
2003, with the strong House version of the Medicare appeals transfer
section intact: ALJs will hear and decide Medicare benefits
administrative appeals, the ALJs are required to have administrative
separation from CMS and its contractors, and the ALJs will report
only to the DHHS Secretary. 79  By April 1, 2004, the SSA
Commissioner and DHHS Secretary must submit a plan to Congress
and the U.S. Comptroller General for the transfer of the AL function
regarding Medicare appeals from SSA to DHHS that includes
provisions consistent with the new statutory requirements to ensure
the independence of ALJs. 80
Laudably, Congress recognized that having the AUs report
directly to the DHHS Secretary will eliminate undue pressures upon
the adjudicators by the CMS management who directly are
responsible for making and implementing Medicare program policy.
However, the DHHS Secretary is the chief policymaker for all of the
programs under his purview, including Medicare, so that the inherent
conflict of policymaker intrusion into the adjudication function from
the policymaker's desire to control the decisionmaker and the
outcome of the decisions still will be present.
on Regulatory and Contracting Reforms (July 24 2003), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=print&ID=103.
79. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, §§ 931(a), 931(b)(2). The subsection of the
Medicare appeals transfer section entitled "Assuring Independence of Judges"
states as follows:
The Secretary shall assure the independence of administrative law judges
performing the administrative law judge functions transferred under
paragraph (1) from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and its
contractors. In order to assure such independence, the Secretary shall
place such judges in an administrative office that is organizationally and
functionally separate from such Centers. Such judges shall report to, and
be under the general supervision of, the Secretary, but shall not report to,
or be subject to supervision by, another officer of the Department of
Health and Human Services.
§ 931(b)(2).
80. Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, §§ 931(a)(1), 931(a)(2)(H).
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Separation of the appellate administrative adjudication function
from DHHS is warranted by (1) the conflict inherent in a
policymaker supervising the adjudicators of appeals from decisions
made in the name of the policymaker, and (2) the agency
policymakers' recent demonstration of the desire and intention to
intrude profoundly into the AU adjudication function for Medicare
appeals, until Congress intervened and passed the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
with the Medicare appeals transfer section.
C. The Need to Separate the Appellate Administrative
Adjudication Function from the Social Security
Administration
Congress made SSA independent of the DHHS in 1994 to ensure
that "policy errors resulting from inappropriate influence from
outside the agency such as those occurring in the early 1980s do not
recur in the future." 81
However, Congress apparently was incorrect in assuming that the
policy errors that led to SSA policymakers' interference with ALJs'
decisional independence came only from influences outside SSA.
The problems have been within SSA, as is shown by the continuation
and proliferation of inappropriate policy, policy implementation, and
management errors that have affected the impartial appellate
administrative review of Social Security Act claims, as is described
in this part. Leaving the adjudication function of OHA under the
administration of SSA is not compatible with administrative
decisional independence and erodes the agency mission of providing
full and fair hearings for Social Security claimants.
In 1935, the Supreme Court held that the desirability of the
neutral exercise of expertise and impartiality of decisionmaking by
Executive Branch agencies warranted the power of Congress to
create independent regulatory agencies and commissions to insulate
81. Characteristics of Independent Executive Agencies, Congressional
Research Service CRS-4-CRS-5 (July 25, 1996), (statement by Rogelio Garcia to
House Subcommittee on Social Security (quoting, SOCIAL SECuRrrY
ADMINISTRATION REFORM Acr OF 1994, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-670, at 90 (2d
Sess. 1994)).
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agency officers from at will removal by the President.8 2 In 1955, the
Hoover Commission strongly advocated the separation of the
adjudication function of Executive Branch agencies from the
agencies to protect the claimants' due process rights:
Where the proceeding before the administrative
agency is strictly judicial in nature, and the remedy
afforded by the agency is one characteristically
granted by the courts, there can be no effective
protection of private rights unless there is a complete
separation of the prosecuting functions from the
functions of decision.83
The rationales for changing how the adjudication of Social
Security cases is done reveals the nature of the change that still is
needed nearly fifty years since the Hoover Commission report:
separation of the appellate administrative adjudication function of
OHA into an entity that is independent of the political policy making
and implementation portions of the SSA. The rationales are as
follows.
The SSA has a long history of trying to use the adjudicatory
function to implement policy, rather than just to decide cases on their
merits. This practice undermines the ALJs' decisional independence
and their ability to provide the claimants with timely, impartial, high
quality and fair decisions of their claims. Examples that have a
history before the SSA became an independent agency in 1994
include the following:
1. SSA's ongoing "non-acquiescence" with decisions by the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal. The SSA has a history of non-
acquiescence
since the SSA was established. [SSA] follows only
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
82. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
83. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1118-1119 (quoting, COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 84-85 (1955)).
294 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
States, or those decisions which [SSA] decides to
adopt by changing the regulations and those decisions
in which [SSA] decides to acquiesce. The system is
intended to insure that claimants in all parts of the
country are governed by the same laws, rules and
regulations. 84
Non-acquiescence forces ALJs to choose between obeying
SSA or following the law as interpreted by the Circuit courts and
risk the approbation of their employer.85
The concept of non-acquiescence was created by the Internal
Revenue Service in the 1920s as a device to signal its intention
not to follow a decision that was issued by the Board of Tax
Appeals, which Congress created in 1924 to provide an
independent tribunal to hear taxpayers' appeals from tax
deficiency notices before they paid the tax. The IRS continued its
practice of non-acquiescence after the Board of Tax Appeals
became the Tax Court.86 The SSA has gone beyond the IRS
policy by following a policy of non-acquiescence with Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions. The SSA non-acquiesced in
a Circuit Court decision ten times between 1968 and 1986 by
issuing Social Security non-acquiescence Rulings that are binding
on the agency by regulation. 87
2. The SSA's Bellmon Review Program in the early 1980s was a
process by which SSA had the Appeals Council do "own motion"
review of 25% to 100% of only the favorable decisions issued
only by ALJs who the SSA had targeted as having highallowance
84. Assoc. of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1139
(D.D.C. 1984).
85. Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of
Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U .L. REv. 1, 8-10 & n.60 (1987).
86. Revesz, supra note 37, at .1112 n.9; Deborah Maranville,
Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism,
39 VAND. L. REv. 471, 474 n.5, 478 n.17 (1986).
87. Maranville, supra note 86, 478 n.15.
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rates of 70% or more. 88 In 1983, the Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs held hearings on the ALJs' role in the Title
II disability insurance program and issued a report that stated its
findings:
The principal findings of the Subcommittee is that the
SSA is pressuring its ALJs to reduce the rate at which
they allow disabled persons to participate in the Social
Security Disability Program .... [The Subcommittee
found that the SSA was limiting the decisional
independence of ALJs through its Rulings, its non-
acquiescence to federal court decisions, and its
increasing of case quotas that reduced the time an AL
could spend on each case to develop additional
evidence that may support an allowance decision,
among other things.] The APA mandates that the AU
be an independent, impartial adjudicator in the
administrative process and in so doing separates the
adjudicative and prosecutorial functions of an agency.
The AU is the only impartial, independent adjudicator
available to the claimant in the administrative process,
and the only person who stand between the claimant
and the whim of agency bias and policy. If the AU is
subordinated to the role of a mere employee, an
instrument and mouthpiece for the SSA, then we will
have returned to the days when the agency was both
prosecutor and judge. 89
3. The wholesale cessation of benefits of hundreds of thousands of
recipients during 1980-1984 without the option to continue
benefits pending appeal. 90 Remedial legislation was necessary to
end the practice. 91
88. The details of how the Bellmon Review was conducted and its impact on
the ALs' decisional independence are set forth in Heckler, 594 F.Supp. at 1134-
1136, and Rains, supra note 85, at 12-15.
89. S. REP. No. 98-111 (1983).
90. Rains, supra note 85, at 7-8.
91. Id.
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4. The longstanding preoccupation with the production of decisions
in quantity at the expense of quality that has undermined the
federal courts' respect for SSA ALJ decisions and resulted in a de
facto appellate standard of review that is unattainably high, rather
than the substantial evidence rule that is supposed to be applied.
5. There were many incidents of SSA management decisions during
the 1980s to attempt to compel individual judges to reduce their
allowance rate, to discipline or threaten to discipline ALJs for
failure to meet production quotas, to control the content of ALJ
decisions, to discourage the ALJs from using medical and
vocational experts at their hearings, and ignoring its own
regulations regarding the sequential evaluation process to deny
mental impairment disability claims, among other things.92
The pitched battle that the SSA ALJs had to wage against SSA
during the 1980s to preserve the independent decisionmaking and
due process under the APA for Social Security claimants was such
that, in 1986, the President of the American Bar Association
presented the SSA ALJs with an award to recognize their efforts to
preserve the hearing process. The award states
[t]hat The American Bar Association Hereby
Commends The Social Security Administrative Law
Judge Corps For Its Outstanding Efforts During The
Period From 1982-1984 To Protect The Integrity Of
Administrative Adjudication Within Their Agency, To
Preserve The Public's Confidence In The Fairness Of
Governmental Institutions, And To Uphold The Rule
Of Law.93
92. These incidents are enumerated in detail in Rains, supra note 85, at 7-15,
and Hearing on the Judicial Independence of Administrative Law Judges at the
Social Security Administration Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
House Ways and Means Committee (June 13, 1990) (statement on behalf of the
AALJ by Ronald G. Bernoski, Secretary).
93. August 1986 ABA award to SSA ALJs (on file with author). See, Paul
Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social
Security Disability Cases: A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board 63, n.
234 (March 2002), available at www.ssab.gov/verkuillubbers.pdf (Last visited Jan.
Fall 2003 Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency 297
Since the SSA became an independent agency in 1994, the SSA
policy and management incursions into the ALJs' decisional
independence have continued, as is explained more fully below,
including:
1. Long term and ongoing "non-acquiescence" by SSA with
decisions by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,
2. The current Quality Assurance Review program, with its abuse of
the adjudicatory purpose of the Appeals Council by having it
implement SSA policy by reviewing only fully favorable ALJ
decisions on its own motion,
3. Statements by senior SSA management that the SSA is not
required to hold hearings pursuant to the APA notwithstanding
that SSA's hearing process uses APA judges who by law can
conduct only APA hearings,
4. Statements by senior SSA management that the SSA has the
power to discipline or remove ALJs by proceedings brought
before the MSPB based upon a failure to decide a quota level of
cases each month, which is contrary to the APA, law set forth in
Nash v. Bowen, agency policy stated in Social Security
Commissioner Gwendolyn King's memo on the Temporary
Suspension of Numeric Performance Goals, and the agreement in
the Bono settlement.94
5. SSA's attempt during the summer of 1999 to discharge the Chief
ALJ for reasons not related to good cause,
6. SSA's reorganization in 1999-2000 of OHA's entire hearings
procedure with the Hearing Process Improvement Plan without
20, 2003) (citing, Charles Bono, Administrative Report, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992,
at 23, 41).
94. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. den., 493 U.S. 813
(1989); Memorandum from Gwendolyn King, Social Security Commissioner, on
the Temporary Suspension of Numeric Performance Goals (March 5, 1990) (on file
with author).
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consulting with the ALJs, which included, among many other
things, a substantial reduction in the ALJs' role in the pre-hearing
development of the case records and a reduction in the control by
ALJs over their work product, and
7. SSA's longstanding preoccupation with the production of
decisions in quantity at the expense of quality.
In 1999, the Federal Agency Compliance Act was introduced in
the House and Federal Bureaucracy Accountability Act of 1999 was
introduced in the Senate to bar the federal agencies' non-
acquiescence policy,95 which is the latest of a series of Congressional
efforts to end the practice.96 The report by the House Committee on
the Judiciary severely criticized SSA for "its repeated
nonacquiescence in the face of contrary appellate court rulings..." 97
and states that the bill is based on a recommendation by the Judicial
Conference of the United States that federal agencies be barred from
non-acquiescence with federal circuit court precedents. 98  The
Judicial Conference explained that legislation is needed because
"unjustified nonacquiescence 'undermines the fundamental principle
that that an appellate court's decision on a particular point of law is
controlling precedent for other cases raising the same issue.' 99
"Nonacquiescence 'violates all our concepts of the rule of law
existing in this country for more than 200 years,"' according to a
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge who testified at a Committee hearing
regarding an earlier similar bill.' 00 The House Judiciary Committee
95. H.R. 1924, 106th Cong. (lst Sess. 1999), S. 932, 106th Cong. (1st Sess.
1999).
96. H.R. REP. No. 106-976, at 4-5 nn.3 & 8 (2000), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cp106/cp106query.html.
97. Id. at 4-8.
98. Id. at 2, citing, Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan
for the Federal Courts, commentary on Recommendation 11, at 35 (1995),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM.
99. Id. 4-6, text at n. 11.
100. Id. 6-7, text at n.14 (citing, Hearing on the Federal Agency Compliance
Act, H.R. 1544, Before the House Committee On the Judiciary, 105th Cong, at 11
(1st Sess. 1997) (statement of Hon. Stephen H. Anderson, Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit).
Fall 2003 Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency 299
report makes it plain that SSA clearly is the most prominent
practitioner of non-acquiescence. In 1996, SSA Commissioner
strongly was rebuked by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit for giving no binding effect to controlling Circuit precedent
until the SSA determined how the case should be implemented:
Regardless of whether the Commissioner formally
announces her acquiescence, however, she is still
bound by the law of this circuit and does not have the
discretion to decide whether to adhere to it. '[T]he
regulations of [the SSA] are not the supreme law of
the land. 'It is, emphatically, the province and duty of
the judicial department, to say what the law is', and
the [Commissioner] will ignore that principle at [her]
peril.' 101
That an act of Congress should be necessary to compel a federal
agency to follow the law of the federal appellate courts is
extraordinary.
On January 31, 1997, the Commissioner of Social Security issued
to the SSA Executive Staff a memorandum of law from the SSA
Office of the General Counsel entitled Legal Foundations of the Duty
of Impartiality in the Hearing Process and its Applicability to
Administrative Law Judges (the "Impartiality Memo"), copies of
which were distributed by the Associate Commissioner of the Office
of Hearings and Appeals to all OHA employees. Contrary to its title,
the bulk of the Impartiality Memo asserts the validity of its non-
acquiescence policy as supreme over the ALJs' judicial independence
in making decisions,' 0 2 and then sets forth in detail the results of the
General Counsel's research to find the outer limits of all of the ways
and things for which ALJs may be disciplined. 10 3 Just two quotes
101. Id. at 7-8 n.19 (quoting, Hutchison v. Chater, 99 F.3d 286, 287-288 (8th
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
102. Memorandum from the SSA Office of the General Counsel, Legal
Foundations of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing Process and its
Applicability to Administrative Law Judges, issued by the Commissioner of Social
Security to the SSA Executive Staff (January 31, 1997) [hereinafter Impartiality
Memo), at 4-5 (on file with author).
103. Id. at 7-21.
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from the Impartiality Memo demonstrates the SSA's hostility to the
ALJs' independence in the adjudication of the claims and desire to
control the ALJs in the performance of their duties:
'In the absence of an instruction to apply court of
appeals holdings to the cases before them, SSA
adjudicators are obliged to apply agency policy and
agency interpretations of the law.' In matters of law
and policy, the Agency head has primacy. An ALT is
bound to follow Agency policy even if, in the AL's
opinion, the policy is contrary to law.' 04
Thus, in 1997, SSA unabashedly set itself above the rule of law
as interpreted by the federal Circuit courts.
Second, although the "Impartiality Memo" sets forth a
recognition that the APA' °5 limits SSA's ability to discipline an ALT
only to certain disciplinary actions after good cause is established and
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") after
an opportunity for a hearing before the MSPB,10 6 the General
Counsel proceeded to rationalize making an end run around the APA
to justify the SSA's current Quality Assurance Review program
practice of having the Appeals Council do "own motion" review of
only favorable decisions by the ALJs and remand them for new
proceedings, if they are found to be not supported by substantial
evidence in the record or defective in any respect. This practice
subjects the AL~s' favorable decisions to more scrutiny than
unfavorable decisions, which works to the detriment of the claimants
and undercuts the perception of fairness and impartiality of agency
adjudication of administrative claims that the APA is intended to
foster. A federal district court found that SSA's Bellmon Review
Program in the 1980s had the Appeals Council do "own motion"
review of 25% to 100% of only the favorable decisions issued only
by AL~s who the SSA targeted as having high allowance rates. The
court also found that the Bellmon Review, together with SSA's
104. Id. at 5-6 (quoting, Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2001).
106. Impartiality Memo, supra note 102, at 8-9.
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practices of non-acquiescence, having ALs who have a high
allowance rate attend peer counseling, and threatening MSPB
disciplinary actions was an "unremitting focus on allowance rates in
the individual AU portion of the Bellmon Review Program [that]
created an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which
violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific provision thereof."'
10 7
The newly independent SSA decided it is legally permissible to again
do "own motion" review only of favorable decisions, so long as only
ALJs with high allowance rates are not the only ones whose cases are
reviewed:
Notwithstanding this finding [in Heckler], the district
court stated that the Agency could 'gather data and
form an opinion of an AU's performance,' and that
nothing prohibited the Agency from calculating and
maintaining such data. Id. at 1140-41. Implicit in this
analysis is the concept that while targeting only ALJs
with high allowance rates might signify pressure on
the ALJs to deny more cases, thus undermining ALJs'
impartiality, an unbiased system of review that
otherwise sought to identify cases in which Agency
rules and standards had not been properly applied,
would not be so tainted. It is thus incorrect to say, as
some have, that the APA prevents an agency from
setting performance standards for ALJs - only those
requirements which impact an AU's ability to decide
cases impartially are prohibited. 108
This statement shows that the independent SSA still believes that
targeting only favorable decisions is permissible and now subjects all
of its ALJs to such review. SSA's current Quality Assurance Review
Program inherently is unfair and discourages the granting of benefits
by ALs.
SSA ALs cannot properly exercise their duty of impartiality to
the claimants whose rights they adjudicate, the preservation of which
is a primary purpose of the APA, when SSA bars them from
107. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1139, 1142-43.
108. Impartiality Memo, supra note 102, at 16-17.
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following the law as interpreted by the Circuit Courts in cases SSA
chooses to not recognize and publicly has crafted fine legal
arguments to support doing variations of the same policy errors as
were made in the 1980s.
SSA's administration of OHA also has been a failure.
Management initiatives such as process redesign, process unification,
prototype, and, most recently, the Appeals Council Process
Improvement Plan ("ACPI") and Hearing Process Improvement Plan
("HPI"), have not achieved their goals.
The Appeals Council, which originally was intended as a policy
making body, has failed in its function as the final step in the
administrative review of Social Security claims. The Associate
Commissioner of OHA is the Chair of the Appeals Council. The
Appeals Council consists of AAJs, who are not selected by the civil
service procedure established by the APA to ensure impartial
decisionmakers who are free of undue agency influence. They are
career civil servants who are required to be attorneys with a certain
level of experience. Because they do not have the APA protections,
Appeals Council AAJs participate in the civil service merit pay
system and are reviewed by the Deputy Chair of the Appeals
Council, which gives SSA policymakers significant control over the
Appeals Council AAJs. Although there is no significant evidence of
direct agency pressure to grant or deny more claims, concern has
been expressed that
SSA policymakers nevertheless are able to create an
adjudicative climate that subtly and indirectly inclines
the Appeals Council toward more or fewer awards,
noting that the Appeals Council always reflects, to
some extent, the interests and style of the OHA
Associate Commissioner. Some have expressed the
view that the Appeals Council is still perceived in
some quarters as an even more partisan 'arm of the
[agency].' 109
In the face of a 66% increase in the number of appeals that the
Appeals Council heard from fiscal year 1994 (69,171) to 1999
109. Koch, Koplow, supra note 29, at 236-40.
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(115,150), its backlog of pending cases ballooned to 144,525 and the
average processing time nearly quadrupled from 118 to 460 days. By
January 2000, the average processing time climbed to 556 days. By
December 2002, the backlog of pending cases was 58,000 and the
average processing time declined to 351 days, which still is triple the
time in 1994.110
At the same time, the quality of the Appeals Council decision
process has plummeted. Cases that were decided by ALJs as long
ago as 1995 and 1996 were remanded to ALJs in 2000. Remands in
cases that were appealed to the Appeals Council years ago still are
occurring. Particularly since the implementation of ACPI, thousands
of cases have been remanded only because the tape recording of the
AU hearing or the entire file was lost by the Appeals Council.
Appeals Council decisions often do not include rationales, rarely
refer to relevant statutes, regulations and cases, and only sometimes
cite SSA Rulings, which reduces the consistency of the decisions.
Appeals Council decisions all too frequently rely upon non-material
errors that do not affect the results in the case. The unprofessional
quality of the Appeals Council decisions has been described by a
federal Circuit Court of Appeals Judge:
I have read many administrative law judges' decisions
on social security disability cases, all of which the
disappointed applicant has asked the Appeals Council
to review (as he had to do before he could begin
judicial review proceedings), but I can remember only
one occasion on which the Appeals Council wrote an
opinion, even when the administrative law judge's
decision raised difficult questions. 111
Decisions that are supported by a full rationale still are rare.
110. Social Security Online, Questions about Hearings and Appeals, Answer
to Question #11, Why does it take so long for the Appeals Council to act on my
case? (Mar. 2003) available at http://www.ssa.gov; SSA, OHA Appeals Council
Process Improvement: Action Plan (March 2000) at 3-4 [hereinafter Action Plan];
SSA, OHA Associate Commissioner's Message, Salute to the Appeals Council
(April 2000) at 1.
111. Rains, supra note 85, at 28 (quoting, R. Posner, The Federal Courts
Crisis & Reform 83, 161 (1985)).
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In 1987, the Administrative Conference of the United States
("ACUS") issued a set of recommendations for improving the
functioning of the Appeals Council, including reorganization,
caseload control, and the quality of the review of cases. ACUS
concluded its recommendation by stating that "[i]f the reconstituted
Appeals Council does not result in improved policy development or
case-handling performance within a certain number of years (to be
determined by Congress and SSA), serious consideration should be
given to abolishing it." 1 12
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, which was an
independent review committee that was formed by Congress in 1988
to study and report on certain federal courts matters and that included
members of Congress and the federal judiciary, issued a minority
recommendation in its final report that the Appeals Council be
abolished and replaced with a Social Security Benefits Review Board
with no further review of the ALJs' decisions by the SSA. 1 3
In 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States ("Judicial
Conference") advocated legislation to strengthen the Social Security
disability claim adjudication process by establishing a new
alternative mechanism for the administrative review of AU decisions
to replace the Appeals Council.' 14 The commentary supporting this
recommendation and strategy states that its purpose is to expand and
improve the speed, accuracy and completeness of the administrative
review process so that the frequency of the need to resort to judicial
review of such claims is reduced. The 1990 proposal by the Federal
Courts Study Committee for a Benefits Review Board was cited as an
example of legislation that Congress may enact to improve the
administrative review of Social Security Act disability claims. 15
Although SSA's ACPI Action Plan stated (sixteen years after the
ACUS recommendations) that higher productivity, much shorter
processing times, and improved public service is necessary, SSA has
allowed the Appeals Council functioning to deteriorate for years
112. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 87-7,
A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council, 1987 ACUS 36 (December
18, 1987).
113. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 58-59 (1990).
114. Judicial Conference, Recommendation 9 and Implementation Strategy 9a,
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 33 (1995).
115. Id.
23-2
23-2
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without regard to the impact on due process and fairness for the
claimants. There is still an absence of timely and efficient case
processing and high quality decisions at SSA's final stage of
administrative review. SSA states that it "will measure the success of
the ACPI initiatives by improvements in average processing time, the
number of pending appeals, and the productivity per [employee]
work year ("PPWY"). ' ' 116 No measure of the quality of the Appeals
Council decisions is mentioned in the Action Plan, which again
demonstrates an absence of quality decisionmaking as an SSA
priority.
The failure of the process unification and prototype was the
foreshadowing for the failure of HPI. Process unification was an
effort to have all DDS and OHA decisionmakers use the same
standards for determining claims. The prototype was an elimination
of the reconsidered determination step at the DDS level in favor of
increased claimant contact and improved medical-vocational
evaluations at the initial level with an evaluation of the claimant's
credibility. The Social Security Advisory Board's June 2000 Report
of the Board's Study of Process Unification and Prototype and
Implementation of the Hearing Process Improvement Initiative in
California ("SSAB California Study") revealed that, even with three
years of training, the simultaneous implementation of process
unification and the prototype resulted in a marked loss of efficiency,
loss of experienced staff from the stress of the now complex job as an
examiner, low pay, and an uneven quality of the initial
determinations. New staff required close to two years of training to
do the complex work demanded by prototype and process unification
and half of the training classes dropped out. The move of DDS from
focusing on objective medical findings to assessing credibility of the
claimant resulted in an inability of the DDS examiners in California
to determine more than twelve cases per week even with extensive
overtime work, which resulted in longer case processing times and
major workload backlogs that required extensive help from other
non-prototype offices. The SSA underestimated the experience and
quality of staff needed to do this more complex analytical work.
However, the increase in the labor-intensive nature of their work did
116. Action Plan, supra note 110, at 10.
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not result in a decline of the reversal rate of DDS denials at the ALJ
level, which was a primary purpose of process unification and
prototype. 117
All of these initiatives were undertaken by the SSA without
consulting with the ALJs for their input, including HPI and ACPI,
which was a major reorganization of OHA. The SSA's plan to
reorganize OHA, which became HPI and ACPI, was not revealed by
SSA until shortly before the release of the first version of HPI in July
1999. As late as March 1999, SSA officials as high as the Deputy
Commissioner for Disability and Income Security Programs denied
the existence of a reorganization plan for OHA to the AALJ, when
the planning for the reorganization was known to all for some time.
In SSA's Strategic Plan 2000-2005, the SSA states that one of its
strategic goals is to
deliver customer-responsive, world-class
service... [that includes] strategies specific to
improving service to disability applicants:
Make changes to the hearings and appeals processes
focused on reducing processing time and improving
efficiency. Hearing process changes [HPI] include a
national workflow model, group-based accountability
and enhanced automation and data collection.
Appeals process changes [ACPI] include short-term
measures, such as case screening and expedited
decisionmaking, as well as long-range proposals, such
as restructuring and IT improvements designed to
enhance service to the public by improving the
timeliness of case processing at the Appeals
Council. 118
117. Social Security Advisory Board, Report of the Board's Study of Process
Unification and Prototype and Implementation of the Hearing Process
Improvement Initiative in California, at 1-9 (June 2000) [hereinafter SSAB
California Study]. These findings are based upon the statements of those
interviewed by SSAB, rather than SSAB's own conclusions about the functioning
of process unification, prototype and HPI.
118. Id. at 23, 28.
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The quality of service is assessed mostly by statistical results: the
percent of hearings decisions issued within 180 days, percent of final
actions on appeals of hearings decisions that are issued within 105
days, average processing times for hearings decisions and for
decisions on appeals of hearings decisions, and number of hearings
and appeals processed per employee work year. Also, the substantial
evidence support rate is used to assess AU decisional accuracy
"pending development of a new accuracy indicator."''1 9 No measure
of the quality of the Appeals Council decisions is mentioned in the
Strategic Plan. When the SSA Commissioner reported some of
SSA's accomplishments to the House Subcommittee on Social
Security in July 2003, she mentioned that the average processing
time of a case appealed to the AU level was reduced to 255 days in
May 2003 from 412 days in fiscal year 2002. However, nothing was
said about decision quality. 120
The SSA Office of Quality Assurance and Performance
Assessment, which is not part of OHA, periodically conducts an AU
peer review process to, among other things, assess whether ALJs'
decisions are supported by substantial evidence in the record, which
is the standard of Appeals Council and judicial review of AU
decisions. The peer review resulted in a finding that 92% of the AU
denial decisions were supported by substantial evidence, but only
83% of the fully favorable decisions were supported, the latter of
which was an improvement over 79% in the prior evaluation. 121
Although AUs performed the review, it is interesting to note that
denial decisions were found to be supported by substantial evidence
significantly more often than were allowance decisions.
The HPI plan entailed significant changes in job duties and titles
for OHA employees that required new job descriptions for all OHA
non-AU personnel and also entailed major changes in how cases are
prepared for hearing. HPI was an effort to reduce case processing
119. Id. at 30.
120. Hearing on the SSA Service Delivery Budget Plan Before the House
Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, 108th
Cong. (1st Sess., July 24, 2003) (statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, SSA
Commissioner),.
121. SSA Office of Quality Assurance and Performance Assessment, Findings
of the Disability Hearings Quality Review Process: ALJ Peer Report III (2000), at
ix, 21-32.
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time within OHA. OHA and the SSA Commissioner now readily
admit that the implementation of the HPI process, which was
supposed to reduce the time that cases are pending for a hearing and
decision and increase output, did not do so. SSA's report on the
implementation of Phase 1 of HPI generally called HPI a success, but
the data for the first four months surveyed, May-August 2000,
showed that the average processing time and per person work years
expended was greater for the HPI cases than the non-HPI cases. l 22
So, HPI cases immediately took longer to process and proved to be
more labor-intensive than processing the cases in the way it was done
before HPI.
The HPI process resulted in significant bottlenecks in: (1) the
clerical preparation of the files so that they are an organized record
that is marked in exhibit form (known as case "pulling"), (2) the
'certification' of the cases as being done with pre-hearing
development and ready for a hearing, and (3) the drafting of
decisions by the writing staff who also spent time reviewing and
'certifying' cases as ready for a hearing. These bottlenecks in the
workflow first were acknowledged by the SSA in its formal training
of the OHA hearing office staffs in the third and last wave of
implementation in the fall of 2000 and the OHA Associate
Commissioner's November 22, 2000, issue of the HPI newsletter,
HPIdeas. 123
ALJs were hearing cases with un-pulled files, and the number of
cases heard and decided using the HPI model declined significantly
from those previously heard. Formerly, ALJs reviewed the cases and
determine what pre-hearing development was needed. The SSAB
California Report that was issued in June 2000 also revealed
concerns with taking the ALJs out of the pre-hearing record
development process until its end, how the clerical function changes
"slowed the process and reduced productivity," and that "HPI will
require additional resources." 124  Clerical staff also were being
rotated among different positions in the OHA hearing offices on a
122. SSA, Implementing a New Hearings Process in OHA: Hearings Process
Improvement: Phase I Implementation Report, Appendix I (October 2000).
123. SSA OHA Associate Commissioner, HPIdeas (November 22, 2000).
124. SSAB California Report, supra note 117, at 9-10. (These findings are
based upon the statements of those interviewed by SSAB, rather than SSAB's own
conclusions about the functioning of HPI.)
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monthly basis, which permitted no benefit from a learning curve of
doing a given job. Thus, HPI quickly resulted in significant
additional delays in claimants receiving hearings and decisions on
their cases.
In June 2001, the Acting SSA Commissioner testified before the
House Subcommittee on Social Security that the HPI implementation
was a challenge and took longer to implement than anticipated, and
the HPI process "has taken a toll on performance."' 125  The current
SSA Commissioner, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, testified before the same
Subcommittee in May 2002 that there were "concerns that [HPI] has
created even more bottlenecks in the process than it was intended to
fix" and explained a number of initiatives to improve case processing
time. 12
6
In March 2003, the current SSA Commissioner testified before a
Congressional subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations that "[t]he [HPI] initiative, which was implemented
in 2000, has not worked" and that the processing time of Social
Security appeals still is "a major concern." The Commissioner stated
that various initiatives would be undertaken to counter the deficits,
including ending the requirement that cases be certified as ready to
be heard. 127 The SSA Commissioner testified before the House
Subcommittee on Social Security in July 2003 that she has
implemented initiatives to contract out the copying and assembly of
case files (pulling work) and end the practice of rotating hearing
office clerks among different positions. 128
125. Hearing on the Social Security Disability Programs' Challenges and
Opportunities Before the House Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee
on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (1st Sess., June 28, 2001) (statement of Hon.
Larry Massanari, Acting SSA Commissioner).
126. Hearing on the Challenges Facing the New Commissioner of Social
Security Before the House Subcommittee on Social Security of the Committee on
Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2nd Sess., May 2, 2002) (statement of Hon. Jo
Anne B. Barnhart, SSA Commissioner).
127. Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriation Requests for SSA Before
the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations,
108th Cong. (1st Sess., March 4, 2003) (statement of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, SSA
Commissioner).
128. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 120.
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The SSA Commissioner also testified before a Congressional
subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in March
2003 that she "will be examining temporary means for
supplementing out ALJ corps in adjudicating hearings in the event
that the ALJ hiring prohibition continues indefinitely." 129 In July
2003, the Commissioner testified before the House Social Security
Subcommittee that the agency's ability to reduce appeals case
processing time and case backlogs is being restricted by the inability
to hire ALJs, but did not mention using non-ALJs. 130
Now that OPM again is processing agencies' requests to hire
ALJs, the Commissioner made her support of the ALJs and their role
in the Social Security disability process clear during her September
25, 2003, testimony before the House Social Security Subcommittee.
At the hearing, the Commissioner presented wide-ranging proposals
to reform the entire disability process from the initial determination
stage through the final administrative decision step. The
Comiissioner recommended the retention of a claimant's due
process right, upon appeal from the agency's claim denial, to a de
novo administrative hearing before an ALT appointed pursuant to
APA. The Commissioner also proposed to abolish the Appeals
Council and add ALJs to the final administrative decision step. It is
commendable that the Commissioner recognizes that the APA
provisions were enacted for the benefit of the claimants and enhance
the disability process. The Commissioner also is encouraging input
from a wide range of stakeholders to aid in developing the details of
her proposals prior to issuing proposed regulations. 131
The Commissioner's bold proposals and inclusive process are
appreciated. However, even with SSA's chief policymaker's best of
intentions, the conflict inherent between the need for independence of
the appellate adjudication process for the benefit of the claimants and
the policymaker's desire to control the decisionmakers and outcome
of claims decisions under programs that the policymaker administers
129. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 127.
130. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 120.
131. Hearing on the Social Security Administration's Management of the
Office of Hearings and Appeals Before the House Subcommittee on Social Security
of the Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (1st Sess., September 25, 2003)
(statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, SSA Commissioner).
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continues to emerge. Only those proposals by the Commissioner that
bear upon the SSA appellate administrative levels are commented
upon in this subpart.
First, there is cause for concern regarding the Commissioner's
proposal that would require ALJs to address the content of a prior
agency decisionmaker's documents regarding Social Security
benefits claims. Currently, a claimant has a right of appeal to an ALJ
from an adverse reconsidered determination by the agency of its
initial determination of a benefits application. The initial and
reconsidered determinations currently are made on behalf of SSA by
employees of state Departments of Disability Services ("DDS"). The
Commissioner proposes the elimination of the reconsidered
determination step. The Commissioner also proposes the creation of
an SSA Reviewing Official ("RO"), who would be an attorney and
would review a claimant's claim file upon the claimant's appeal from
an adverse initial determination by the agency of a benefits
application. The RO would have authority to grant a benefits claim
but no authority to deny a claim outright. 132
The Commissioner proposes that, if an RO does not grant a
disability claim, the RO will issue either (1) a Recommended
Disallowance when the RO believes that the evidence shows that the
claimant is not disabled, or (2) a Pre-Hearing Report when the RO
believes that the evidence is insufficient to determine eligibility for
disability benefits. The Pre-Hearing Report will state what evidence
is needed to successfully support the claim. The Commissioner also
proposes that, only when an AU is granting disability benefits, an
AL's decision must either state in detail why the RO's
Recommended Disallowance is being rejected, or describe the new
evidence added since the RO's Pre-Hearing Report that corresponds
to the list of evidence that the RO said is needed for a successful
claim. 133
There is no proposal that either requires details in the ALJ's
decision regarding why the AU is accepting an RO's Recommended
Disallowance, or requires a description of the new evidence
supporting a denial of the claim in reference to an RO's Pre-Hearing
132. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 131.
133. Id.
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Report. 134 Therefore, the Commissioner's proposal would require
that an AU provide a more extensive defense of granting benefits
than denying benefits when discussing the RO's Recommended
Disallowance and Pre-Hearing Report in the AL's decision.
Accordingly, the proposal presumes the correctness of the RO's
assessment as to what evidence is sufficient to grant or deny a
disability benefits claim, which may incorrectly be interpreted as a
requirement that the RO's assessment is entitled to some degree of
deference.
The Commissioner told AAJ officers on October 24, 2003, that
her proposal regarding how an AU must address the RO's
Recommended Disallowance or Pre-Hearing Report in the AL's
decision is not intended to interfere with the APA and Social Security
Act requirements for an AU's decision. 135 However, despite the
Commissioner's good intentions for the proposal, the presumption of
the correctness of the RO's assessment of the evidence that is
embodied in the proposed disparity in the required treatment of the
RO's documents by the AU that depends upon the outcome of the
case does impinge upon the de novo, 3 6 independent nature of the
AL's hearing and decision process. Holding a de novo hearing
means to hear a matter anew, as if it is being heard for the first time
and no decision previously were rendered. 137 De novo review is
"independent" review. 138  Accordingly, such an impingement will
foster a perception of agency pressure to deny cases, unfairness, and
improper deference to the RO documents in AU denials among
claimants and their representatives that likely will result in an
increase in the number of appeals from AU denials of benefits.
Moreover, any specific regulatory requirement that that the AU
address the RO's documents would create the potential for erroneous
arguments on appeal and appellate findings that an AU's decision is
deficient for a failure to adequately address or defer to the RO's
Recommended Disallowance or Pre-Hearing Report. The standard
134. Id.
135. AALJ President's Report, at 1 (October 27, 2003) (on file with author).
136. The ALJ level of review is a de novo review. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 339 n. 21 (1976).
137. Ness v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1992).
138. Premier Communications Network, Inc. v. Fuentes, 880 F.2d 1096, 1102
(9th Cir. 1989).
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for a sufficient AU decision on appeal is whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the decision, not whether the AU
adequately addressed the contents of a prior decisionmaker's
recommended decision or report. 39
Therefore, augmenting the proposal to require such statements
regarding the RO documents in all AU decisions, regardless of the
outcome, does not cure all of the issues that the proposal raises. The
creation of these issues by the proposal suggests that the proposal is
not the most effective way to achieve the Commissioner's apparent
goal of greater consistency between the RO and AU decisions, since
the likely increase in the number of appeals from ALJ denials and
appellate error regarding how ALJs address the ROs' documents will
defeat any potential for an increase in decision consistency between
the RO and AU levels that the proposal is intended to achieve.
To preserve the independent, de novo nature of the AU hearing
and decision, the Commissioner should consider omitting a
requirement that an AU address the RO's documents from her
proposed regulations. The APA and Social Security Act already
require that an AU discuss the evidence in rendering the decision on
a disability benefits claim without reference to the outcome of the
AU's decision or prior agency determinations. The APA requires
that all agency administrative decisions, including AU
"decisions... shall include a statement of (A) findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (B) the
appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof."' 40 Title II
of the Social Security Act sets forth the elements to be included in
agency administrative decisions regarding eligibility for disability
benefits:
Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social
Security which involves a determination of disability
and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such
139. "The Appeals Council will review a case if (1) There appears to be an
abuse of discretion by the administrative law judge; (2) There is an error of law; (3)
The action, findings or conclusions of the administrative law judge are not
supported by substantial evidence; or (4) There is a broad policy or procedural
issue that may affect the general public interest." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c).
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individual shall contain a statement of the case, in
understandable language, setting forth a discussion
of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner's
determination and the reason or reasons upon
which it is based. Upon request by any such
individual or upon request by a wife, divorced wife,
surviving divorced mother, surviving divorced father
husband, divorced husband, widower, surviving
divorced husband, child, or parent who makes a
showing in writing that his or her rights may be
prejudiced by any decision the Commissioner of
Social Security has rendered, the Commissioner shall
give such applicant and such other individual
reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with
respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held,
shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing,
affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's
findings of fact and such decision.14
Decisions regarding supplemental security income eligibility
under Title XVI and Medicare eligibility under Title XVIII of the
Social Security Act must include the same elements as decisions
regarding Title II disability eligibility. 142
Instead of the proposal of a requirement that an AU address the
RO's documents, which places a higher burden on AUs to justify
granting benefits than denying them, an effective way to increase the
consistency of decisionmaking between the RO and AU decision
levels would be to require that the RO use the same legal standards
for determining disability as those by which the AUs are bound,
rather than the current practice of having the initial agency
decisionmakers use a difference and primarily medical set of
standards. Since ROs will be attorneys, implementation of legal
standards for their decisionmaking will be met with a success that
demonstrably has not been possible with non-attorney
decisionmakers, such as the failed Process Unification Training for
141. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (emphasis added).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(1)(A), 1395ff(b)(1).
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DDS decisionmakers and Adjudication Officer initiatives in the
1990s.
Second, there is cause for concern regarding the Commissioner's
omission of a claimant's right of appeal from an AU's adverse
decision to the new final step of administrative review that would
replace the Appeals Council, and inclusion of subordinate SSA
employees in the new final step. The SSA Commissioner's proposals
include replacing the Appeals Counsel with a "Centralized Quality
Control Review" ("CQCR") function within SSA with the final step
of administrative review being by "Oversight Panels" of two ALJs
and one AAJ upon referral of cases by CQCR staff. The individual
AU's decision will be the final Commissioner's decision, if it is not
reviewed by the CQCR or if it is affirmed by an Oversight Panel. If
an Oversight Panel changes the outcome of the decision, then the
Oversight Panel decision becomes the final Commissioner's decision.
The claimants may appeal any final agency action to a United States
District Court, but no right of appeal from an AU's decision to an
Oversight Panel is stated. AAJs are the subordinate employees who
currently serve on the SSA Appeals Council.
143
The Commissioner's Oversight Panel proposal borrows from the
author's proposal for local appellate panels of three ALJs as the final
step to replace the Appeals Council in the Social Security Act claims
administrative process that is part of the author's detailed proposal
written for AALJ for an AJ-administered independent adjudication
agency for Social Security Act benefits cases with the exclusive
jurisdiction to make the final administrative decisions of Social
Security Act Title II, XVI and XVIII benefits claims. The proposal
for the new adjudication agency is the basis for this article. 144
Under the AALJ proposal, the claimants and the SSA would
have a right of appeal of an individual AU's decision to an appellate
panel staffed by ALJs that would consist of three AUs who would
review the cases regionally or locally. The appellate panels would be
akin to the Bankruptcy Court appellate panels. Based upon the
Bankruptcy Court experience, the appellate panel model (1) is an
appellate system that can handle a large caseload, (2) results in higher
quality decisions because of expertise, (3) results in substantially
143. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 131.
144. See, supra first unnumbered note.
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fewer appeals to the courts and a substantially lower reversal rate by
the courts because of the bar's and courts' confidence in the high
quality of the decisions, which reflects a higher degree of decision
accuracy by three expert decisionmakers working together, (4) results
in a substantially reduced federal court caseload, (5) results in a
shorter disposition time because the large pool of about 1,000 SSA
ALJs permits the timely determination of appeals that cannot take
place with a small body such as the Appeals Council, and (6) affords
the claimants access to a local appellate process. 145
The AALJ proposal for local ALT appellate panels to replace the
Appeals Council was favorably and extensively commented upon and
recommended for use within SSA OHA in a March 2002 report
commissioned by the SSAB. 146 It is the SSAB report that apparently
brought the appellate panel proposal to the Commissioner's
attention. 147
I am gratified that the Commissioner is proposing the panel
approach to replace the Appeals Council. However, so far, it does
not appear from the Commissioner's September 25, 2003, testimony,
and public statements that she has made since the hearing that the
claimant may appeal an individual AU's decision to an Oversight
Panel. 148 This is a major departure from AALJ's recommendation
that would eliminate many of the benefits of the appellate panel
concept, including much greater decisional consistency between the
final administrative and initial court levels and fewer appeals to the
federal courts. The Commissioner states that the CQCR and
Oversight Panels are a quality review process, not an appellate step,
as an explanation for why there is no claimant's right of appeal to an
Oversight Panel. Another departure from the AALJ proposal is the
145. See discussion supra Part I, text at n. 18 and infra Part VIII(E).
146. Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial
Review of Social Security Disability Cases 19-21, 56, 63-68 (March 2002),
available at www.ssab.gov/verkuillubbers.pdf. This article includes an exhaustive
survey of the many recommendations over the last 20 years to abolish the Appeals
Council and suggested replacement mechanisms, including the AALJ proposal.
147. The Commissioner referenced Professor Jeffrey Lubbers, one of the
authors of the SSAB report, as a source during her testimony. Statement of Hon. Jo
Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 131.
148. Statement of Hon. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, supra note 131; AALJ
President's Report, supra note 135, at 1.
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use of an AAJ, a subordinate SSA employee with no protections for
decisional independence, as one member of the three-member
Oversight Panels. Also, the Commissioner has not yet determined
whether the Panels will be regional or local for better access to the
claimants, as AALJ recommends. Finally, the Commissioner has not
yet determined whether Panel membership will rotate among the
SSA AU workforce. 1
49
The quality review step posited by the Commissioner to the
Oversight Panel level is an appeal, not only quality review, since the
outcome of the case may change, and, if it does, the Panel decision
becomes the final decision of the Commissioner. Quality review
usually involves a post mortem review of closed cases. The
claimants must have a right to appeal to the Panels in order for the
claimants, SSA, the courts, and the American public to receive the
many demonstrated benefits to the Social Security disability process
of an appellate panel process, including faster appellate decisions,
increased consistency between the final SSA administrative decisions
and initial court decisions, and fewer federal court appeals.
Without claimant appeals to the Oversight Panels, the District
Courts will be inundated with appeals from the individual AU
decisions, and will not have the benefits of the higher quality
decisions and reduction of caseloads that would result from the better
decisions by the Panels. There are about 100,000 claimant appeals to
the Appeals Council per year, which would be a burden for the
District Courts.' 50
Also, permitting the agency appellate review of an AL' s
decision by an Oversight Panel, which is relatively easier, faster and
lower cost than a District Court appeal, but limiting the claimants to
only a District Court review of an adverse ALJ decision, raises
substantial fairness and due process issues. The omission of the
claimants' right to access the final administrative appellate step to
review an AL's decision increases the risk that erroneous denials of
benefits will not be corrected because some claimants, particularly
pro se claimants, who would be able to pursue a relatively simple
administrative appeal will not have the wherewithal to bear the
additional burden of prosecuting a court appeal.
149. AALJ President's Report, Id.
150. See discussion infra Part VIII(E).
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So that Social Security claimants, SSA, the federal courts, and
the American public reap the benefits of a Bankruptcy Court
appellate panel-style process, the Commissioner should consider
modifying her Oversight Panels proposal and issue regulations that
provide that (1) a claimant has a right of appeal to the Oversight
Panels, (2) the Oversight Panels is the final step of administrative
review that must be taken by a claimant in order to seek judicial
review of the Commissioner's decision in the claimant's case, (3)
only independent decisionmakers may serve on the Oversight Panels,
meaning AUs who have the protections of the Administrative
Procedure Act that have been put in place for the benefit of the
claimants, (4) the Oversight Panels will be constituted regionally or
locally for claimant access, (5) the Oversight Panels will be
constituted from the full nationwide SSA AU workforce to ensure
nationwide AU participation, and (6) there will be rotation of
Oversight Panel duty among the ALJs in the SSA AU workforce to
ensure that the Panel ALJs have recent line experience with hearing
and deciding cases. All of these suggested modifications are the
elements of the Bankruptcy Court appellate panel process that have
made that process a demonstrated success.
The 27 AAJs from the Appeals Council may be afforded
protections for decisional independence for the benefit of the
claimants by grandfathering the AAJs into AU status, as was done in
the 1970s for the administrative judges who heard SSI cases. 151
The appellate panel system should result in faster and much
higher quality decisions than those produced by the Appeals Council,
but only if it functions as an appellate step for both the claimants and
agency. A fully developed appellate panel process greatly will
enhance the consistency of outcome between the final administrative
step and District Court step, and reduce the number of appeals, just as
it has between the Bankruptcy Court appellate panels and next level
of judicial review. A detailed statement of the AU appellate panel
151. "In 1977, Congress enacted Public Law Number 95-216, containing a
section entitled Appointment of Hearing Examiners, which deemed the temporary
ALJs to be permanent ALJs appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105 of the APA."
Arzt, supra note 1, at 304 & n. 96 (citing, Social Security Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509, 1559 (1977)).
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proposal and description of the elements and merits of the
Bankruptcy Court experience with the appellate panel process is
stated in this article.
152
Therefore, SSA policymakers' longstanding history of significant
intrusions into the ALJ and Appeals Council adjudication function
amply warrants separation of the appellate administrative
adjudication function from SSA.
IV. PRESERVATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT TO SOCIAL SECURITY ACT BENEFITS
ADJUDICATIONS IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE DUE PROCESS AND
FAIRNESS FOR THE CLAIMANTS
In 1946, the APA was enacted to, among other things, achieve
reasonable uniformity and fairness of the administrative process in
the federal government. This includes uniform standards for the
conduct of adjudicatory proceedings including the appointment of
hearing examiners, who now are ALJs.
153
As is discussed in section Ill(C), senior SSA management
personnel stated several years ago that SSA is not required to hold
hearings pursuant to the APA. Such personnel readily do
acknowledge that the SSA hearing process, in fact, uses APA judges
and complies with the APA. After these statements, in 2000, the
SSA Commissioner issued a written statement in which he confirmed
the applicability of the APA to Social Security Act adjudications.
154
The claimants' due process rights are put in jeopardy by assertions
that the APA applies only at the sufferance of the SSA, which is the
agency that determines their claims, particularly in view of SSA's
ongoing policymaking and implementation encroachments upon the
independence and impartiality of the ALJs and adjudication process
152. See discussion infra Part VIII(E).
153. Manual, supra note 1, at 9. The APA, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946), as amended, currently is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (sets forth an
administrative procedure), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (provides for judicial review of
final administrative decisions), and 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E),
5335(a)(B), 5372, and 7521 (provisions regarding administrative law judges).
154. Arzt, supra note 1, at 318-319 (citing, Letter from Kenneth S. Apfel, SSA
Commissioner, to Judge Ronald G. Bernoski, President, AALJ (January 9, 2001)
(on file with author)).
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that are enumerated above. Title II of the Social Security Act, which
sets forth the old age and survivors benefits program, predates the
APA and so contains no express reference to it, a style that was
continued in the statutes for the additional programs that later were
added to the Social Security Act.
Adjudications pursuant to the Social Security Act, including
Medicare adjudications, also are adjudications pursuant to the APA
because (1) the SSA is an "agency" within the definition in Section
2(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), and (2) a Social Security Act
hearing is a proceeding that is an "adjudication" within the definition
in Section 2(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(7). Because hearings
held pursuant to the Social Security Act also are APA adjudications,
ALJs appointed pursuant to Section 11 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 3105,
must preside over the hearings, since none of the narrow exceptions
to the use of APA ALJs provided for in the APA apply to Social
Security Act adjudications. These principles are established by the
unambiguous and repeatedly stated legislative intent of Congress,
and are confirmed by the federal courts and the longstanding
administrative practice of the SSA and the Office of Personnel
Management ("OPM"). 155
The APA was enacted by Congress after over ten years of studies
and proposals "to improve the administration of justice by
prescribing fair administrative procedure" in response to "a
widespread demand for legislation to settle and regulate the field of
Federal administrative law and procedure . . . [and] reasonably
protect private parties."' 156 The House Report also described the
purpose of the APA:
[I]t is designed to provide for publicity of information,
fairness in administrative operation, and adequacy of
judicial review. The purpose of the bill is to assure
that the administration of government through
administrative officers and agencies shall be
conducted according to established and published
155. Arzt, supra note 1, at 279; Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make
the Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALIs, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203
(Summer 2002).
156. S. REP. No. 79-752, at 1, 5 (1945).
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procedures which adequately protect the private
interests involved, the making of only reasonable and
authorized regulations, the settlement of disputes in
accordance with the law and the evidence, the
impartial conferring of authorized benefits or
privileges, and the effectuation of the declared policies
of Congress in full.
157
The House Report regarding the APA cogently describes what
the APA does, both in terms of (1) providing the minimum standards
for federal administrative due process in the Executive Branch, and
(2) delineating different procedures for "legislative" administrative
proceedings (rulemaking as an agency's legislative function) and
"adjudicative" administrative proceedings (individual case decisions
about rights or liabilities as an agency's judicial function):
The [APA] is an outline of minimum essential rights
and procedures. Agencies may fill in details, so long
as they publish them. It affords private parties a
means of knowing what their rights are and how they
may protect them, while administrators are given a
simple framework upon which to base such operations
as are subject to the provisions of the bill.
What the [APA] does in substance may be
summarized under four headings: 1. It provides that
agencies must issue as rules certain specified
information as to their organization and procedure,
and also make available other materials of
administrative law (sec. 3). 2. It states the essentials
of the several forms of administrative proceedings
(secs. 4, 5, and 6) and the general limitations on
administrative powers (see. 9). 3. It provides in more
detail the requirements for administrative hearings ...
(secs. 7 and 8). 4. It sets forth a simplified statement
157. H. REP. No. 79-1980, at 18 (1946).
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of judicial review designed to afford a remedy for
every legal wrong (sec. 10).
The public information section is basic, because it
requires agencies to take the initiative in informing the
public. In stating the essentials of the different forms
of administrative proceedings, the bill carefully
distinguishes between the so-called legislative
functions of administrative agencies (where they issue
general regulations) and their judicial functions (in
which they determine rights or liabilities in particular
cases). It provides quite different procedures for the
"legislative" and "judicial" functions of administrative
agencies. In the "rule making" (that is, "legislative")
function it provides that with certain exceptions
agencies must publish notice and at least permit
interested parties to submit their views in writing for
agency consideration before the issuance of general
regulations (sec. 4). No hearings are required by the
bill unless statutes already do so in a particular case.
Similarly, in "adjudications" (that is, the "judicial"
function) no agency hearings are required unless
statutes already do so, but in the latter case the mode
of hearing and decision is prescribed (sec. 5). Where
existing statutes require that either general regulations
(called "rules" in the bill) or particularized
adjudications (called "orders" in the bill) be made
after agency hearing or opportunity for such hearing,
then section 7 spells out the minimum requirements
for such hearings, section 8 states how decisions shall
be made thereafter, and section 11 provides for
examiners to preside at hearings and make or
participate in decisions.
While the administrative power and procedure
provisions of sections 4 through 9 are law apart from
court review, the provisions for judicial review afford
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parties a method of enforcing their rights in proper
cases (sec. 10).158
In the Manual, the Attorney General stated that "[t]he
Administrative Procedure Act may be said to have four basic
purposes: 1. To require agencies to keep the public currently
informed of their organization, procedures and rules (sec. 3). 2. To
provide for public participation in the rule making process (sec.4). 3.
To prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rule making
(sec. 4(b)) and adjudicatory proceedings (sec. 5), i.e., proceedings
which are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing (secs. 7 and 8). 4. To restate the
law of judicial review (sec. 10).159
As Congress observed in its legislative history supporting its
legislation that made the SSI hearing examiners permanent ALJs, the
APA
is the general scheme under which rule making and
adjudicatory procedures are carried out by agencies in
the executive branch. Section 556 of title 5 requires
that (unless the agency itself presides) administrative
law judges (AL's) shall preside over all rule making
or adjudicatory proceedings to which the APA
applies. 160
An agency is required to use APA ALJs for its adjudications only
if it is required to perform its adjudicatory proceedings pursuant to
the APA. The APA puts many protections in place to ensure that
ALJs are independent and impartial in adjudicating administrative
claims. In Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the
reasons that Congress enacted the APA's many protections to assure
the decisional independence of ALJs and enumerated those
protections:
158. Id. at 16-17.
159. Manual, supra note 1, at 9.
160. Conversion of Temporary Administrative Law Judges, H.R. Doc. No. 95-
617, at 2 (1977).
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The [APA] process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the [AU] exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him,
free from pressures by the parties or other officials
within the agency. Prior to the Administrative
Procedure Act, there was considerable concern that
persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level
could not exercise independent judgment because they
were required to perform prosecutorial and
investigative functions as well as their judicial work,
see, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,
36-41 (1950), and because they were often
subordinate to executive officials within the agency,
see Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953). Since the securing of fair
and competent hearing personnel was viewed as 'the
heart of formal administrative adjudication,' Final
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure 46 (1941), the
Administrative Procedure Act contains a number of
provisions designed to guarantee the independence of
[ALJs]. They may not perform duties inconsistent
with their duties as [ALJs]. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 ... When
conducting a hearing under § 5 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
554 . . . [an ALJ] is not responsible to, or subject to
the supervision or direction of, employees or agents
engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecution functions for the agency. 5 U.S.C. §
554(d)(2) ... Nor may [an AU] consult any person or
party, including other agency officials, concerning a
fact at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate. [5 U.S.C. §
554 (d)(1)]. [ALJs] must be assigned to cases in
rotation so far as is practicable. [5 U.S.C. § 3105].
They may be removed only for good cause established
and determined by the Civil Service Commission
[now OPM] after a hearing on the record. [5 U.S.C. §
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7521]. Their pay is also controlled by the [OPM.] [5
U.S.C. § 5372].161
There are additional ALJ safeguards. The appointment of ALJs
pursuant to section 3105 is effected by a competitive civil service
process administered by the OPM. 162 The only exceptions to the
applicability of the competitive civil service laws to ALJs are the
provisions of the APA that were designed to make ALJs partially
independent of the agencies that employ them. "The APA creates a
comprehensive bulwark to protect ALJs from agency interference.
The independence granted to ALJs is designed to maintain public
confidence in the essential fairness of the process through which
Social Security benefits are allocated by ensuring impartial
decisionmaking."1 63 These exceptions are carried over into the OPM
regulations. "Except as otherwise provided in this subpart, the rules
and regulations applicable to positions in the competitive service
apply to administrative law judge positions." 164  The additional
safeguards include the following:
1. The civil service "requirement of a probationary and career-
conditional period before absolute appointment does not apply to
an appointment to an administrative law judge position."' 165
2. ALJ pay is regulated by OPM independent of agency
recommendations or ratings. 166  "An agency may not grant a
monetary or honorary award under 5 U.S.C. 4503 for superior
accomplishment by an administrative law judge in the
performance of adjudicatory functions."' 167
161. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-514 (1978).
162.5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1305 (2002).
163. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 20 (2nd Cir. 1980).
164. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(b) (2003).
165. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3323(b), 4301(2)(D) (2003); 5 C.F.R. §
930.203a(b).
166. 5 U.S.C §§ 554, 5372 (2002).
167. 5 C.F.R § 930.2 10(b) (2003).
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3. ALJs appointed pursuant to Section 3105 are excluded from the
definition of "employee" for the purposes of the statutes that
govern the performance appraisal of federal employees.1 68 "An
agency shall not rate the performance of an administrative law
judge."' 69  Since "administrative law judges are not given
performance ratings, the OPM regulations in part 351 of [Title 5,
Chapter 1] referring to the effect of performance ratings on
retention standing are not applicable to administrative law
judges."' 170
4. Unlike other competitive service federal employees, ALJs are
subject to adverse action by the employing agency, including
removal, suspension, reduction in grade, reduction in pay, or a
furlough under thirty-one days, "only for good cause established
and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the
record after opportunity for hearing before the Board."'17 1
"Procedures for adverse actions by agencies under the OPM
regulations in part 752 of [Title 5, Chapter 1] are not applicable
to actions against administrative law judges."' 172 This provision
prevents the President or his appointees within the agencies from
summarily removing ALJs at will, which helps to protect APA
adjudications from political intrusion. 17 3  ALJs are subject to
ethics standards and can be removed for misconduct after a
hearing before the MSPB.17
4
In Federal Maritime Commission, the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed (1) the applicability of the APA to federal administrative
adjudications, (2) "the similarities between the role of an AU and
that of a trial judge," (3) "the numerous common features shared by
administrative adjudications and judicial proceedings," and (4) the
168. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2002).
169. 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (2003).
170. Id. at § 930.215(b).
171. 5 U.S.C § 7521 (2002).
172. 5 C.F.R. § 930.214(a) (2003).
173. Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the
Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1784 (1985).
174. 5 U.S.C § 7521 (2002).
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importance of the APA structure that ensures the ALJs'
independence of agency influence in deciding cases. 17 5 The Supreme
Court relied upon its language in Butz, 176 which is quoted here more
fully directly from Butz:
[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency
adjudication contain many of the same safeguards as
are available in the judicial process....They are
conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political
influence. See [5 U.S.C. § 554(d)]. A party is entitled
to present his case by oral or documentary evidence [5
U.S.C. § 556(d)], and the transcript of testimony and
exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the
exclusive record for decision. [5 U.S.C. § 556(e)].
The parties are entitled to know the findings and
conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or
discretion presented on the record. [5 U.S.C. §
557(c)].
There can be little doubt that the role of the modem
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge
within this framework is "functionally comparable" to
that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally,
comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue
subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the
course of the hearing, and make or recommend
decisions. See [5 U.S.C. § 556(c)]. More
importantly, the process of agency adjudication is
currently structured so as to assure that the hearing
examiner exercises his independent judgment on the
evidence before him, free from pressures by the
parties or other officials within the agency. 177
175. Federal Maritime Comm'n. v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 756-757 (2002).
176. Id. at 756 (quoting, Butz, 438 U.S. at 513).
177. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-514. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(c)-(e),
557(c) (2002).
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The decisionmaking independence provided by the APA is not
for the benefit of the AU but instead is for the protection of the
American people. The APA protections are intended to ensure that
the American people receive a full and fair due process hearing with
a decision based only on the evidence in the hearing record without
agency pressure.
The SSA OHA is the largest administrative adjudication body in
the United States and hears over 500,000 cases per year. The
Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he Social Security hearing
system is 'probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western
world."'' 178  The Social Security hearing process is the face of the
United States government to most people who seek benefits. How
people view that face depends upon the quality of due process they
receive.
The APA allows for high quality due process that must be
preserved in Social Security Act cases for the benefit of the claimants
and Medicare beneficiaries and providers.
V. A COURT MODEL CANNOT BE USED FOR APPELLATE
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
An Article I or Article II court model cannot be used as the
format for an Executive Branch agency that performs only an
adjudicative function and continues to have the agency's appellate
administrative adjudications performed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 551-
559 of the APA by APA ALJs. The APA provides that, for its
purposes, "agency" means "each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency, but does not include.. .(B) the courts of the United
States. 179
A federal Executive Branch "authority," whether it is an agency
or within an agency, is defined by its power to issue a final decision.
The power to make a final decision is the key to being an "agency"
178. Barnhart v. Thomas, __ U.S. __ 124 S. Ct. 376, 382 (2003) (quoting,
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n. 2 (1982)).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2002) (section 2(a) of the original statute).
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within the definition of the APA. Congressional legislative history
makes it clear that the SSA, which formerly was known as the Social
Security Board, expressly has been intended by Congress to be an
"agency" covered by the APA. i s° DHHS also is an "agency" covered
by the APA, since it is one of the fourteen Executive Branch cabinet
departments. 181
The APA definition of "agency" apparently excludes not only all
Article III courts and Article I tribunals in the Judicial Branch, but
also all executive branch Article I tribunals that perform judicial
review of final administrative agency adjudications and Executive
Branch Article II tribunals that are labeled "courts" by Congress and
review initial administrative agency adjudications. The
"Constitutional" courts are those with judges appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to
Article III, Section 1, and who hold their offices during good
behavior and without diminishment of their salary. Current examples
of Article III courts include the Supreme Court, which is specifically
created in the Constitution, and the courts established by Congress
pursuant to its power to create "inferior courts," such as the Courts of
Appeals (including the twelve geographic circuits and the Federal
Circuit), the District Courts, and the U.S. Court of International
Trade. The Article I tribunals are the courts established by Congress
pursuant to its power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, to create
"tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Current examples of
Article I tribunals that are within the Judicial Branch include the
Territorial Courts, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels as units of the
District Courts. Current examples of Article I tribunals that are
outside the Judicial Branch and are in the Executive Branch include
the United States Tax Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Congress also has the power to establish Article H Executive Branch
agencies for any purpose in furtherance of its powers that are
enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, including judicial review of final
180. A detailed examination of the meaning of "agency" for the purposes of
the APA and the APA's application to Social Security Act adjudications, are set
forth in Arzt, supra note 1, at 284-289.
181. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
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administrative determinations made by Executive Branch agencies.
The U.S. Tax Court was such an Executive Branch Article II court
until it was converted into an Article I Executive Branch court in
1969.182
The Senate and House reports regarding the APA state that "[t]he
word 'agency' is defined by excluding legislative, judicial, and
territorial authorities and by including any other 'authority' whether
or not within or subject to review by another agency."' 183 No specific
examples of the federal courts that are excluded from APA coverage
are given in either report.
However, the Manual includes two Article I courts in the Judicial
Branch and an Article II Executive Branch court as specific examples
of Congress' exclusion of APA application to "the courts of the
United States:"
The Administrative Procedure Act applies to every
authority of the Government of the United States other
than Congress, the courts, the governments of the
possessions, Territories, and the District of Columbia
(sec. 2(a)). The term "courts" is not limited to
constitutional courts, but includes the Tax Court, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of
Claims, and similar courts.X84
The Manual is a part of the legislative history of the APA. The
Manual is "a contemporaneous interpretation" of the APA'85 that has
been "'given some deference by [the Supreme] Court because of the
role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation,
and Justice [Tom C.] Clark was Attorney General both when the
182. See infra text accompanying notes 189-203.
183. S. REP. No. 79-752 at 10 (1945); H. REP. No. 79-1980 at 18 (1946).
184. Manual, supra note 1, at 10 (1947) (citing S. REP. No. 79-752 at 38
(1945) (the Appendix to Attorney General's Statement Regarding Revised
Committee Print of October 5, 1945) reprinted in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, at 42 (William F. Funk et al., 3d ed. 2000).
185. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 546 (1978).
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APA was passed and when the Manual was published."" 186 "In prior
cases, [the Supreme Court has] given some weight to the Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), since
the Justice Department was heavily involved in the legislative
process that resulted in the Act's enactment in 1946.187 Justice Scalia
has described the Manual as "the Government's own most
authoritative interpretation of the APA .... That document.. .was
originally issued 'as a guide to the agencies in adjusting their
procedures to the requirements of the Act."
1 88
A close look at the three non-Article III courts cited in the
Manual as examples of courts that are excluded from APA coverage
clearly shows that Executive Branch Article I tribunals that review
final administrative agency adjudications and Article II tribunals that
review initial administrative agency adjudications that are labeled
"courts" by Congress both are "courts of the United States" that were
intended to be excluded from coverage by the APA adjudication
procedure under 5 U.S.C. § 551-559. Thus, the APA definition of
"courts of the United States" is far broader than the Article III only
"courts of the United States" definition that is used to describe the
organization of the Judicial Branch in Title 28, United States Code:
The term 'courts of the United States' includes the
Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals,
district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this Title [28
U.S.C. §§ 81 et seq.], including the Court of
International Trade and any court created by Act of
Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold
office during good behavior. 1
89
186. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102, n. 22 (1981) (quoting, Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 546).
187. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, n. 31 (1979) (citing Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 546).
188. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting, Manual, supra note 1, at 6 and citing, Steadman,
450 U.S. at 102; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.,
435 U.S. at 546).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2002).
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The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals originally was
established by Congress as an Article I court within the judicial
branch in 1909 with the name "Court of Customs Appeals." In 1929,
its name was changed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and its jurisdiction was expanded. In 1929, the Supreme Court held
in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals is a court of the United States that is an Article I legislative
court, not a constitutional Article III court, because of the lack of life
tenure of its judges. 190 It was not until 1958, after the Manual was
issued, that Congress converted the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals into an Article III court. 191
In 1855, Congress established the first Article I specialized court,
the United States Court of Claims, "to hear private claims against the
United States."' 92 The Court of Claims was created by Congress to
alleviate the growing and substantial burden on Congress and the
Executive Branch departments of determining such claims. 93 The
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. held that the Court of
Claims, which is "a special tribunal to examine and determine claims
for money against the United States," is an Article I legislative court
that "is a court of the United States," not a constitutional court.194 In
1933, the Supreme Court again ruled that the Court of Claims is an
Article I legislative court: "the court derives its being and its powers
and the judges their rights from the acts of Congress passed in
pursuance of other and distinct constitutional provisions."'' 95  In
1953, again after the Manual was issued, Congress converted the
Court of Claims into an Article III court. 196
190. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458-461 (1929).
191. 1999 FED. JUDICIARY ANN. REP., Table K: Specialized Courts and the
Administrative Lawmaking System, available at
http://www.usccourts.gov/judbus1999/contents.html; Revesz, supra note 37, at
1132 n.98 (citing ACT OF AUG. 25, 1958 §§ 2-4, 72 Stat. 848-849 (1958)).
192. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1114 n.8 (citing, ACT OF FEB. 24, 1855, 10 Stat.
612 (1855)).
193. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 452.
194. Id. at 455.
195. Williams v. U.S., 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933).
196. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1132 n.98 (citing, ACT OF JULY 28, 1953, 67
Stat. 226 (1953)).
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In 1962, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Congress' 1950s
legislation converted the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the Court of Claims into Article III courts. 197  Therefore, both the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims were
Article I courts at the time that the Attorney General stated in the
Manual that they were not covered by the APA.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Court of Claims
both were abolished in 1982 by Congress and the jurisdictions and
judges of both courts were merged into the newly created U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit is a
specialized court a significant portion of the jurisdiction of which is
to review the final administrative decisions by several Executive
Branch agencies, including the International Trade Commission,
Merit Systems Protection Board, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Secretary of the Commerce Department, Secretary of Agriculture, the
General Accounting Office, the Office of Personnel Management,
and the various agency Boards of Contract Appeals. The jurisdiction
regarding some of the agencies' decisions is limited to those made
under certain statutes. In addition to hearing appeals from the Patent
and Trademark Office and the trial level U.S. Court of Federal
Claims that was created as an Article I court in 1982, the Federal
Circuit also reviews decisions by: the U.S. Court of International
Trade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that was
created as an Article I court in 1988, the District courts (only for
claims against the United States up to $10,000. that are not tort or tax
claims), and the Senate Select Committee on Ethics.1
98
Finally, the Tax Court has its origin in the Board of Tax Appeals,
which was formed in 1924 as an Executive Branch board
independent of the Internal Revenue Service to provide taxpayers
with an independent administrative review of an IRS tax deficiency
determination before the tax had to be paid. 199 Earlier boards that
Congress established within the IRS for the same purpose were given
quasi-independent status, but had insufficient authority to survive the
197. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962); Revesz, supra note 37,
at 1132 n.98.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2002); Revesz, supra note 37, at 1112-1113 nn. 2 &
10, 1126 n. 65.
199. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1113 n. 9 (citing, REVENUE ACT OF 1924, § 900,
43 Stat. 253, 336-38 (1924)).
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IRS' attempts to end their existence. 200 In 1942, Congress changed
the name of the Board of Tax Appeals to the Tax Court of the United
States. 20' However, Congress did not redefine the Tax Court into an
Article I court until 1969. The court was renamed the United States
Tax Court. 20 2 The Supreme Court has held that the Tax Court was an
Executive Branch agency until its conversion into an Article I court
in 1969.203 Therefore, the Tax Court was functioning as an Article II
"board model" independent agency in the Executive Branch that was
doing appellate administrative review of initial decisions by the IRS,
not judicial review of final agency decisions, at the time that the
Attorney General stated that it was excluded from APA coverage
because it is called a court. Thus, bearing the label "court" is enough
to exclude an Article II independent agency from APA coverage.
Therefore, Executive Branch Article I tribunals that review final
administrative agency adjudications and Article II tribunals that are
labeled "courts" by Congress and review initial administrative
agency adjudications are "courts of the United States" that are
intended to be excluded from coverage by the APA adjudication
procedure under 5 U.S.C. § 551-559. Accordingly, an independent
agency established for appellate administrative review of the SSA's
and DHHS' initial adjudications of Social Security benefits claims
cannot be called a court and also be subject to the APA provisions.
200. Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Federal Judicial Independence
Symposium: Judicial Independence: Can it be without Article III?, 46 MERCER L.
REv. 863, 869 (1995); Revesz, supra note 37, at 1119.
201. Revesz, supra note 37, at 1113 n. 9 (citing, REVENUE ACT OF 1942, § 504,
56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942)).
202. Id. at 1113 n. 9 (citing, TAx REFORM ACT OF 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §
951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (1969) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7441 et seq.).
203. Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 887-88 (1991).
Fall 2003 Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency 335
VI. AN INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION AGENCY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
ACT BENFITS CLAIMS DOES NOT REQUIRE A COMMISSION TO
PERFORM ITS ADJUDICATION FUNCTION BECAUSE SOCIAL
SECURITY POLICY IS NOT PROMULGATED THROUGH THE
ADJUDICATION FUNCTION
Historically, the reason Congress gave quasi-adjudicatory
functions to regulatory agencies, rather than to the generalist District
Courts, was (1) because certain areas of law were "specialized" and
required a uniform national standard of applicability, and (2) to allow
political appointees, such as Commissioners, to formulate policy
through adjudication. It was expected that the adjudications would
be relatively few in number and the decisions would have an
important general impact on the individuals whose conduct was
being regulated.
The APA was enacted to assure that "due process" principles
when a regulatory agency had both prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions. Traditional regulatory commissions, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), and the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), set
policy through adjudication, as well as rulemaking. For example, the
ICC promulgated rules regarding how much a railroad could charge
customers. A violation of those rules was prosecuted by an ICC-
employed prosecutor and the case was heard by an ICC-employed
ALJ. An appeal from the ICC AL's decision was decided by the
Commissioners of the ICC, who injected their decisions with policy
and political concerns. The Commissioners' decision could be
appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The APA was designed to ensure procedural due process to
individuals who are prosecuted by the same agency that promulgates
the regulations and also adjudicates violations of the regulations.
Regulatory agencies have similar functions to those set forth in
Articles I, II and III of the Constitution for the three branches of
government. A traditional regulatory agency promulgates (quasi-
legislative), enforces (quasi-executive) and adjudicates (quasi-
judicial). The APA is a claimants' bill of rights that provides a
procedure for conducting a due process hearing that comports with
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the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution. 214
When agencies such as the Department of Labor's Mine Safety
and Health Administration ("FSHA"), Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), SSA, and
CMS within DHHS exclusively use rulemaking proceedings to set
policy, rather than also using adjudication to set policy, there no
longer is any rationale for keeping the adjudicatory function within
the agency. The Congressional interest in providing a check on the
enforcement powers, i.e., to withhold disability benefits in the case of
SSA and Medicare benefits in the case of CMS, is best served by
having an independent adjudicatory entity decide entitlement
determinations based on the entitlement standards set by SSA and
CMS. There no longer is any link between adjudication and policy
making for the Social Security Act benefits claims, which are a vast
number of adjudications that involve primarily factual and credibility
issues, the decisions of which have no precedential value for
subsequent cases.
The SSA and CMS are not traditional regulatory agencies, as are
MSHA and OSHA, but this is a distinction without a functional
difference. Traditional regulatory agencies and benefits agencies
both perform quasi-legislative, quasi-executive and quasi-judicial
functions.2 °5 However, DHHS includes not only CMS, but also the
quasi-executive enforcement function regarding Medicare, Medicaid
and other federal health care enforcement proceedings brought under
the Social Security Act and other applicable statutes, the appeals
from which currently are heard on administrative appeal by ALJs
within the Civil Remedies Division of the DHHS Departmental
Appeals Board that administratively is within the Office of the
DHHS Secretary. The final administrative decision-making authority
on these cases is vested in the DHHS Secretary. 20 6
204. Edward H. Fleischman, Toward Neutral Principles: The SEC's Discharge
of Its Tri-Functional Administrative Responsibilities, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 251(1993) (discusses the conflicting practices of independent federal regulatory
agencies); Steven P. Croley, Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: The
Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A Reconciliation, 10
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 35 (1996) (discusses the modem regulatory state).
205. Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 973-74 (1991).
206. Supra text accompanying note 5 & n. 5.
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A traditional regulatory agency is charged with regulating private
conduct by: promulgating rules, determining whether individuals
have violated the rules, and determining sanctions for any violations.
The traditional regulatory agency promulgates and enforces its own
regulations. SSA promulgates and enforces regulations regarding
who is "entitled" to Social Security benefits. CMS promulgates and
enforces regulations regarding who is entitled to Medicare benefits.
Social Security Act benefits are entitlements that require a due
process hearing when SSA or CMS denies a claim of legal
entitlement to statutory benefits. SSA and CMS promulgate and,
through granting and denying benefits, enforce their own regulations.
The same rationale for establishing an independent adjudicatory body
exists in equal measure for adjudications determining entitlement to
disability and other Social Security program benefits, such as
Medicare, as for determining the propriety of private conduct: to
provide a check on the enforcement powers of the regulatory agency
and to assure that there is no arbitrariness in the exercise of those
powers. 20
7
The SSA and CMS make policy through rulemaking, rather than
through adjudications. Therefore, there is no policymaking reason
why (1) the AU adjudication function should be part of the SSA or
DHHS, or (2) an AU's decision should be appealed to an
administrative tribunal within SSA or DHHS. The notion that SSA
or DHHS could promulgate policy through adjudication is
completely negated by the following facts: (1) the overwhelming
majority of Social Security Act adjudications are concerned primarily
with factual rather than legal or policy issues, (2) the SSA Appeals
Council and DHHS Medicare Appeals Council entirely have
abrogated their policymaking role, and (3) all SSA and CMS policy
currently is established through the rulemaking process, rather than
case decisions with precedential value.
20 8
There are two exclusively adjudicatory, rather than regulatory,
agencies that were created by Congress as commissions: the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("FMSHRC") and the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC").
207. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1988).
208. Gifford, supra note 205, at 1010-11.
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FMSHRC was established by the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977. FMSHRC's sole statutory mandate is to
adjudicate disputes between the MSHA and mine operators. The
enabling legislation transferred the ALJs from the Department of the
Interior into FMSHRC.2 °9  OSHRC was established by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Its sole statutory
mandate is to adjudicate disputes between the OSHA and
employers. 210
The adjudicatory commissions, FMSHRC and OSHRC, perform
solely adjudicatory (quasi-judicial) functions, not policy
making/rulemaking functions (quasi-legislative) or enforcement
(quasi-executive) functions. Traditional regulatory commissions
perform all three functions. The two adjudicatory commissions were
created independent of any other entity (agency, department,
administration) to assure evenhanded justice to private individuals:
justice that could not be assured if the policymaking function and/or
enforcement function were lodged in the same entity as the
adjudicative function. Currently, the SSA has all three functions
(policy/rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication) in the same
governmental entity, and DHHS soon will have the same.
The Commissioners, five for FMSHRC and three for OSHRC,
are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, serve six-year terms, and are removable only for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. ALJs are appointed by the
Chairs of the Commissions. 2 11
Congress gave the two adjudicatory commissions independence
from the underlying regulatory agencies of MSHA and OSHA within
the Department of Labor in order to provide a check on enforcement
powers of the regulatory entities, and to assure that there is no
arbitrariness in the exercise of those powers. The commissions are
arbiters the purpose of which is to ensure that the relevant agency
acts within the boundaries of the law and that private parties are
accorded due process.21 2
209. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982).
211. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982).
212. W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of Authority under the Mine Act:
Is the Authority To Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary of Labor or
in the Review Commission, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 1063 (1996).
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FMSHRC's and OSHRC's rules of procedure provide for two
levels of administrative adjudication. The first level is before an
ALJ. The second level is a discretionary review of the ALJs'
decisions by the Commissioners, with a standard of review that is
similar to that of the SSA's Appeals Council.213 An ALJ's decision
that is not accepted for review by either commission becomes a final,
non-precedential order of the commission. Commission decisions
that are decided by the Commissioners, rather than an ALJ, are
precedential. Appeals from the final decisions of FMSHRC and
OSHRC are taken to a regional United States Circuit Court of
Appeals. 2
14
FMSHRC and OSHRC have only executive adjudicatory
functions. They do not have rulemaking or enforcement powers, and
they do not set policy. They were established to review
administrative actions, rather than set policy through adjudication.
Both commissions determine whether regulations promulgated by
MSHA and OSHA have been violated.
FMSHRC and OSHRC review determinations made by
traditional regulatory agencies, which regulate private conduct. The
primary rationale for making FMSHRC and OSHRC independent
entities was to separate the adjudicatory functions from the
underlying regulatory agencies' prosecutorial and policymaking
functions. This separation was possible because the regulatory
agency, as an entity, had evolved from setting policy through in-
house adjudication, to setting policy through rulemaking. Similarly,
the SSA and CMS long since also have evolved into agencies that set
their policy for the standards of who is entitled to Social Security
program benefits by rulemaking, rather than adjudications. Indeed,
CMS had 130,000 pages of regulations regarding the Medicare
program in effect as of July 2003.215
Currently, until a case reaches an Article III court for review,
SSA and DHHS are unchecked in their use of their enforcement
powers through Appeals Council Review of ALJ decisions and their
application of their regulations to private individuals. SSA has a long
213. Id.
214. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982).
215. Press Release, Conferees of the Medicare Prescription Drug and
Modernization Act of 2003, supra note 78.
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history of attempting to undermine independent adjudication at the
AU level by applying aggressive management techniques in an
attempt to control administrative law judges, as is described in detail
in part I(C) above. 216 For a time, the DHHS Secretary and CMS
actively sought authority from Congress to use alternatives to APA
due process, including independent APA ALJ decisionmakers for
Medicare program appeals, as is described in detail in part III(B),
above. 217
However, there are several differences of scale and function
between FMSHRC, OSHRC, and the huge Social Security Act
benefits adjudication process that militate against the need for a
Commission structure for an independent Social Security Act
benefits adjudication agency.
First, FMSHRC and OSHRC are very small entities with a few
AUs and relatively few cases to adjudicate. FMSHRC's fiscal year
2000 budget estimate was for fifty-one full-time employees (twenty
at the hearing level), with a budget of $6,159,000. The fiscal year
2000 budget estimate of case dispositions at the AU level was 2,500
(the actual number in 1998 was 1,804).218 OSHRC has seventy-three
full time employees located in Washington, D.C., Atlanta and
Denver. In fiscal year 1999, OSHRC employed twenty-eight people
at the hearing level, and disposed of 158 cases after conducting a
hearing and 2,127 cases without conducting a hearing. OSHRC's
fiscal year 2001 budget estimate was $8,720,000.219 SSA AUs
account for over 84% of all AUs employed by the federal
government (1,081 in SSA, 213 in other agencies as of March 2003)
to handle over 500,000 cases per year.220
Also, FMSHRC and OSHRC hear cases regarding private
216. See supra, text accompanying notes 81-152. See also, Daniel J. Gifford,
Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future
Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (Winter 1997); Gifford, supra note 205, at 1009-
19.
217. See supra, text accompanying notes 46-80.
218. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n Offical Website, available at
http://www.fmshrc.gov.
219. U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n Official Website,
available at http://www.oshrc.gov.
220. OPM ALJ employment statistics for March 2003, available at
http://www.fedscope.opm.gov.
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conduct. An independent Social Security Act benefits adjudication
agency would hear claims for public benefits.
Finally the Commissioners of FMSHRC and OSHRC review
relatively few ALJ decisions compared to the current level of review
by the SSA Appeals Council and DHHS Medicare Appeals Council.
Also, the Commissioners' decisions are precedential, unlike the SSA
and DHHS Appeals Councils' decisions. The Appeals Councils'
primary role was originally intended to be policymaking. However,
SSA and DHHS long since have abandoned the Appeals Councils'
original role as policymaking bodies through adjudication, and the
Appeals Councils have become quasi-appellate bodies. The tyranny
of the caseload, in which a massive number of cases are concerned
with factual and credibility issues, does not allow the Appeals
Councils to perform the role of policymaking bodies through
adjudication for the SSA Commissioner and DHHS Secretary. 221
Therefore, since an independent Social Security Act benefits
adjudication agency would not set precedent through its decisions
that would warrant political accountability, it is difficult to justify a
"role" for politically accountable Commissioners. A small
Commission would have no greater success at handling the great
number of appeals from ALJ decisions of Social Security Act
benefits claims than the small SSA Appeals Council and DHHS
Medicare Appeals Council have had. Hence, the proposal in parts
VII and VIII that the independent Social Security Act benefits
adjudication agency be an adjudicatory body that is self-administered
by the ALJs, with the right to appeal from individual ALJs' decisions
to local appellate panels staffed by ALJs around the country.
Many agencies are increasing their use of non-ALJ
adjudications.222 This trend provides strong evidence for the need to
preserve the highest level of decisional independence in the
administrative adjudications of the largest benefits programs in the
federal government by establishing an independent agency that is
beyond the reach of the SSA and DHHS policymakers before they
also find a way to join the trend of avoiding APA due process.
221. Koch & Koplow, supra note 29, at 199.
222. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Symposium on the 5c/h Anniversary of the APA: APA-
Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65,
70-71 (Spr. 1996).
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VII. WHY AN INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTERED BY ALJs PROVIDES A HIGHER QUALITY OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND DUE PROCESS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
CLAIMANTS THAN AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION STRUCTURE
As stated in Part VI, there is no need for politically accountable
non-adjudicators, such as Commissioners, to oversee an exclusively
adjudicatory independent agency, since such an agency would not
make policy for which Congress would want political accountability.
With an independent Commission, the Commissioners would be
a group of non-judicial appointees who would be an extra layer of
personnel over the ALJs who would supervise the ALJs, set the
procedure and rules for the hearings, and review the ALJs' decisions
as the Appeals Council does now. This is the current management
structure that the SSA ALJs have with the SSA Commissioner.
Congress made the SSA independent of the Department of Health
and Human Services to strip away the executive layers between
Congress and the SSA in order to hold the SSA more accountable in
the administration of the Social Security entitlement programs. As is
described in part III(C), the SSA management and policy intrusions
into the decisional independence of its ALJs have continued since
SSA became an independent agency.
Having the new agency's ALJs administer themselves through a
Chief Judge who is appointed from their numbers would eliminate
the political oversight by appointees who do not have adjudicative
independence as their foremost goal in agency administration, which
has caused problems for the decisional independence of SSA ALJs
over the years. SSA was a Board within a larger agency until 1950,
and has had a Commissioner for the last fifty years. SSA was part of
a larger agency until 1995, when it became independent. Both board
and commissioner formats have been tried for over sixty years and
found wanting in terms of agency incursions into ALJ decisional
independence. ALJs, as experienced judicial personnel, have the
capacity for collegial and professional self-administration such as
that which occurs in the courts. There is a large degree of
administrative expertise within the SSA ALJ workforce. The SSA
AL~s also have a demonstrated history of defending their decisional
independence and due process that will place the preservation of due
process as the primary goal of the new agency. The Chief Judge
selected from the ALJs' ranks would be answerable to Congress and
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the President. There is a large degree of administrative experience
within the SSA ALJs. If the SSA ALJs become a self-administered
independent adjudication review agency, they would administer
themselves with ALJs chosen from their own ranks.
In addition, as stated in part VI, a commission, which rarely has
more than a dozen members, cannot be of a size sufficient to conduct
meaningful administrative review of the appeals from the individual
ALJ decisions, which now number well over 100,000 per year. A
commission necessarily will be forced to hire an attorney staff akin to
the SSA Appeals Council to process the appeals, which will not
result in an improvement of the current poor quality and delays in the
final appellate step of administrative review of Social Security Act
program claims. If the new agency is administered by the ALJs,
claimants will have a final review of the individual ALJs' decisions
by local panels of ALJs around the country who are drawn from a
large pool of highly qualified personnel who will be able to render
timely and well drawn decisions.
Finally, if the SSA ALJs self-administer, they will draft and issue
the procedural regulations and rules of the new agency, which will be
based on their experience and needs of the process, rather than
expediency and other policy concerns, as they are now. There never
has been a coherent set of procedural regulations and rules for the
SSA appellate administrative process, although there is a draft of
such rules awaiting SSA promulgation.
The SSA ALJs are a large group of highly qualified judicial
professionals who are capable of administering themselves and the
appellate administrative process in a competent and effective manner.
The Administrative Conference of the United States found that ALJs
are, on average, as academically well-credentialed as District Court
judges, and about 80% have substantial trial or general litigation
experience. 223 The Supreme Court has held that an ALJ is the
functional equivalent of a federal trial-level judge in the performance
of his or her adjudicative function:
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge
223. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT 1992, Vol. II, 879 (1992).
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within [the APA] framework is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge. His powers are often,
if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge:
He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence,
regulate the course of the hearing, and make or
recommend decisions. 224
Therefore, having the ALJs administer themselves is well
justified and makes sense in terms of providing claimants with
timely, high quality and impartial final administrative decisions that
are free of political or policy considerations. The intent is to enhance
the Social Security Act hearing system for the claimants by providing
the structural independence of the appellate adjudication process that
is necessary to ensure that the claimants receive the full range of
procedural due process required under the Social Security Act and
the APA.
VIII.AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY MODEL FOR A SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS ADJUDICATION REVIEW AGENCY
The remainder of this article consists of detailed proposed terms
for a separate United States Office of Hearings and Appeals
("USOHA") within SSA to provide the structural independence of
the appellate adjudication process necessary to ensure administrative
appellate decisional independence for the benefit of the Social
Security benefits claimants. Most of these terms are features that
would be the same for a new independent adjudication agency,
regardless of whether it is administered by ALJs or a Commission.
However, the appellate panels of ALJs as the final administrative
appellate step and ALJ self-administration features of this proposal
are what make this proposal a workable blueprint that (1) can
efficiently handle a large caseload with high quality, and (2) afford
the claimants maximum decisional independence for their claims.
This proposal would be added as a new title of the Social Security
Act (Title 42, chapter 7) and amend Titles II, XVI and XVIII of the
Social Security Act (Title 42, chapter 7, Titles II, XVI, XVIII).
224. Butz,,438 U.S. at 513 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1976).
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The proposed terms of the new agency are set forth in this part in
fourteen subparts. Each subpart has two sections. In the first section
of each subpart, the proposed features are stated either in summary
form or with suggested statutory language necessary to implement
the features. In the second section of each subpart, the reasons for
the proposed features are stated.
The APA procedural due process protections were the first step in
assuring that an agency that promulgates and enforces regulations
affords procedural due process to individuals and other parties. An
administrative adjudicatory body that is structurally independent of
the Social Security Act policy-making agencies is the necessary next
step in the process of assuring that individuals receive fair hearings
and impartial, high quality, and timely decisions by independent
decisionmakers.
A. Agency Name, Establishment
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: AGENCY NAME,
ESTABLISHMENT
The United States Office of Hearings and Appeals hereby is
established and is referred to in this Title as the "Office of Hearings
and Appeals."
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: AGENCY
NAME, ESTABLISHMENT
As is discussed in part V, an Article I or Article II court model
cannot be used as the format for an Executive Branch agency that
performs only an adjudicative function and continue to have the
agency's appellate administrative adjudications performed pursuant
to the APA by ALJs. 225 Therefore, the use of the name "United
States Office of Hearings and Appeals" is descriptive, because it
makes clear that its is purpose to adjudicate administrative claims
involving Social Security Act benefits programs, which is an
executive administrative function, not to perform judicial review of
225. See supra text accompanying notes 179-203.
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final administrative decisions of the SSA and DHHS, which is a
judicial function.
B. Independent Agency, Executive Branch Department
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: INDEPENDENT AGENCY,
EXECUTIVE BRANCH DEPARTMENT
The United States Office of Hearings and Appeals shall be an
independent regulatory agency in the Executive Branch of the
Government that is a department of the Executive Branch within the
Social Security Administration.226 In the performance of their
functions, the Chief Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Chief
Administrative Law Judge(s), administrative law judges, other
officers, other employees, and other personnel of the adjudication
agency shall not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or
direction of any officer, employee, or agent of any other part of the
SSA or DHHS.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR:
INDEPENDENT AGENCY, EXECUTIVE BRANCH
DEPARTMENT
Designation as an independent regulatory agency is essential to
have the new independent adjudicatory agency be accountable only
to Congress and the President. The phrase "independent regulatory
agency" is the technical phrase for an agency that Congress makes
independent of the usual degree of Executive Branch oversight, and
does not mean that such an agency necessarily regulates conduct or
benefits programs. Examples of independent regulatory agencies that
Congress has created within existing agencies to perform
adjudications, among other things, include the (1) Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") within the Department of Energy,
and (2) Surface Transportation Board ("STB") within the
Transportation Department. The STB replaced and took over the
functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 227  The
226. 42 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1994).
227. 49 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702, 703(c) (1997).
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OSHRC 228 and (2) FMSHRC 229 are exclusively adjudicatory
agencies that are outside of the Labor Department and are
independent regulatory agencies. 230 The only list of the independent
regulatory agencies that appears in a statute is found at 44 U.S.C. §
3502(5), which addresses federal information policy and includes
OSHRC and FMSHRC.
Placing the new agency within the SSA is a practical necessity,
given the need to use the SSA's information services and data bases,
the substantial space needs of the new agency that currently are in
place at SSA, the use of the same case files, and the fact that the new
agency will be sharing the duty to adjudicate claims under the Social
Security Act benefits programs and, thus, will interact on a daily
basis with other components of SSA.
As stated above, Congress formed the Board of Tax Appeals as
an agency independent of the IRS to provide claimants with impartial
review because of the IRS' practice of non-acquiescence with Circuit
Court decisions, and the inherent unfairness to claimants of having
the same agency that investigates and prosecutes cases also perform
the administrative appellate review. The IRS invented federal agency
non-acquiescence. These same reasons, and SSA's history of
interference with AU decisional independence, support the creation
of an administrative appellate review agency that is separate from the
SSA.
The new agency's independence from management by SSA and
DHHS must be expressly stated, as was done in the statutes that
established the STB, 231 rather than rely only on stating that the new
agency is an independent agency. The proposed provision that the
officers and employees of the new agency shall not be responsible to,
or subject to, the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or
agent of any other part of the SSA or DHHS is identical to the
independence provision for the STB.232 In order to obtain SSA's and
DHHS' full compliance and cooperation with the implementation of
this proposed legislation, expressly stating the full intent of each
228. 29 U.S.C. § 661(1978).
229. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1979).
230. Garcia, supra note 81 at 1, n.1.
231.49 U.S.C. § 703(c) (1995).
232. Id.
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feature is necessary, rather than leaving anything to inference, no
matter how obvious. As is discussed in part III(C), the SSA has a
well-known history of non-acquiescence with federal Circuit Court of
Appeals decisions, despite the clear binding effect of the Court of
Appeals decisions within their Circuits. Remedial legislation
regarding non-acquiescence, which should not have been necessary,
was introduced in the 10 6 th Congress as House Report 1924. Several
years ago, some SSA senior management officials advanced the
concept that the SSA is not required to provide APA hearings,
despite overwhelming legal authority to the contrary.233 As is
discussed in section III(B), the DHHS Secretary and CMS recently
sought Congressional authority to use non-AU decisionmakers for
Medicare appeals, which Congress rejected. 234
Finally, the agency must be an Executive Branch department so
that its principal officer, the Chief Administrative Law Judge,
unambiguously has the power to appoint inferior officers pursuant to
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Appointments
Clause provides in pertinent part:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.235
Therefore, since the new agency will not be a court of law, it
must be an Executive Branch department for its head to be authorized
to appoint inferior officers. Making sure the new agency head is
empowered to appoint inferior officers is essential, not only to the
head's ability in general to appoint the inferior officers needed to
233. See supra text accompanying note 94.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 46 - 80.
235. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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assist in running the agency, but because the issue of whether ALJs
are inferior officers who must be appointed pursuant to the
Appointments Clause recently was raised in the federal courts.
236
In Landry v. FDIC, the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the ALJ whose decision was the subject of the Landry appeal was not
an "inferior officer" of the federal government who must be
appointed pursuant to the provisions of the Appointments Clause.
237
Landry is a savings and loan officer who was assessed civil penalties
by an ALJ employed by the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"),
the bureau of the Treasury Department that regulates the savings and
loan industry. Landry collaterally challenged the AU's decision by
asserting that the AL's decision was without effect because the AU
is an inferior officer who was not properly appointed by the head of a
department as required by the Appointments Clause, since he was not
appointed by the Treasury Department Secretary. The Landry court
followed Supreme Court precedent, finding that, since the agency
could change the OTS AU's decision without giving it deference, the
AU's decision was not a final decision of the agency and, therefore,
the ALJ is not an inferior officer.238
Since there are many ALJs who do issue final decisions for their
agencies, including SSA ALJs, the outcome in Landry is not the
resolution of the appointment issue. The appointment issue is
important because the validity of the subsequent acts of an ALJ and
his or her status as a federal employee can be challenged, if the
appointing authority lacked appointment power.
The four most recent Supreme Court Appointments Clause cases
regarding judicial officers follow a two step analysis. The first
question is whether the judicial officer is a mere employee or an
inferior officer who must be appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause. So far, all judicial officers have been held to be inferior
officers. The second question is whether judicial officers, as inferior
officers, were appointed by an authorized court of law or head of a
236. My article regarding this issue is forthcoming.
237. Landry v. United States, 204 F.3d 1125, 1128-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 924 (2000)).
238. Id. at 1128-34.
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department.239
The issue of whether ALJs are inferior officers is described below
as part of the proposal that the new agency head must be appointed as
a politically accountable principal officer and must directly appoint
the ALJs. The following is a summary of the law on what is an
Executive Branch department for the purposes of the Appointments
Clause.
In Freytag, after finding that special trial judges employed by the
U.S. Tax Court are inferior officers, the Supreme Court held that all
inferior officers must be appointed by the President, courts of law, or
heads of departments, and Congress does not have discretion to
mandate another appointment method. 240  "Heads of departments"
was construed rather narrowly to include heads of cabinet
departments, by limiting the definition of "department" to the
fourteen executive departments that are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101(State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Transportation, Energy, Education, and Veterans
Affairs). However, the Court also said that the Appointments Clause
is not so strictly limited by its terms and left the door open for
possible later approval of inferior officer appointments by heads of
principal agencies.24'
The Supreme Court in Freytag held, 5 to 4, that the U.S. Tax
Court is a court of law empowered to appoint special trial judges.
The Court left open the issue of whether an agency is a
department. 242 However, four of the Justices, all of whom still are on
the Court, stated in their concurring opinion that the Tax Court is a
department of the executive branch 243 and that "department" should
be construed as a separate executive organization run by a principal
officer.24 The concurring justices' standard appears to be more in
accord with both the Constitutional term of "department," which is
239. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Ryder v. United States,
515 U.S. 177 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994); Freytag v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
240. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877-81.
241. Id. at 886.
242. Id. at 882-91.
243. Id. at 901-21.
244. Id. at 919-21.
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not limited to any specific class of Executive Branch departments,
and the APA standard of an agency being any federal authority with
the power to issue final administrative decisions.
245
In addition, Congress clearly states in the following other statutes
that there are "departments" in the Executive Branch other than the
"executive departments" enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 101: Congress
defined "federal agency" for the purposes of the statute on the federal
agencies' use of passenger carriers to include "(A) a department (as
such term is defined in section 18 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (41
U.S.C. 5a)), (B) and Executive department (as such term is defined in
section 101 of Title 5)y246 Section 18 of the Administrative Expenses
Act of 1946, 41 U.S.C. § 5a, provides that "'department' as used in
this Act shall be construed to include independent establishments
[and] other agencies. '"247
C. Independent Establishment
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: INDEPENDENT
ESTABLISHMENT
The United States Office of Hearings and Appeals shall be an
independent establishment of the Executive Branch as is defined in 5
U.S.C. § 104.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR:
INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENT
For the purposes of Title 5, entitled "Government Organization
and Employees," the Executive Branch consists of: (1) the fourteen
"executive departments" that are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101, (2) the
three "military departments" listed in 5 U.S.C. § 102 (Army, Navy,
and Air Force), (3) "government corporations" and "government
controlled corporations," which are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 103, and
(4) "independent establishments," which are defined in 5 U.S.C. §
104 as "an establishment in the executive branch.. .which is not an
245. Administrative Procedure Act § 1,5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994).
246. 31 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(2)(A)-(B) (2003).
247. Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, § 18, 41 U.S.C. § 5a.
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Executive department, military department, Government corporation,
or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment."
"'Executive agency' means an Executive department, a Government
corporation, and an independent establishment." 248  Thus,
independent regulatory agencies are "independent establishments."
This provision is added to expressly state where the new agency fits
in the Executive Branch structure described in Title 5.
D. Exclusive Jurisdiction over Final Decisions of Social Sec'urity
Act Benefits Claims
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
OVER FINAL DECISIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
BENEFITS CLAIMS
The United States Office of Hearings and Appeals shall have the
duties and jurisdiction as are conferred on it by Title 42, Chapter 7,
of the Social Security Act, as amended, by the Administrative
Procedure Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., or by laws
enacted subsequent to the enactment date of the statutes that establish
the United States Office of Hearings and Appeals.
The U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals shall perform all
administrative appellate adjudicatory functions that, immediately
before the effective date of its creation, were functions of the SSA,
SSA OHA, and DHHS and were performed by any officer or
employee of the SSA, SSA OHA, and DHHS in his or her capacity as
such officer or employee, but not the policy-making, policy-
implementation, investigatory and prosecutorial functions of the SSA
or DHHS.
It shall be the duty and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Office of
Hearings and Appeals to adjudicate all claims arising from the old-
age, survivors, and disability insurance programs under Title II [42
U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.] and the supplemental security income program
under Title XVI [42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.], after initial denial in
whole or in part by the SSA Commissioner, and the Medicare
program (health insurance for the aged and disabled program) under
Title XVIII [42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq.], after initial denial in whole
248. 5 U.S.C. § 105 (1996).
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or in part by the DHHS Secretary.
Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) of the Social Security Act
should be amended as follows: "The Commissioner of Social
Security is directed to make findings of fact, and initial decisions as
that term is used in section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act [5
U.S.C. § 557(b)] as to the rights of any individual applying for a
payment under this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.]. Any such initial
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security which involves a
determination of disability and which is in whole or part unfavorable
to such individual shall contain a statement of the case, in
understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence,
and stating the Commissioner's determination and the reason or
reasons upon which it is based, and shall include a notice of such
individual's right of appeal to the Office of Hearings and Appeals
within sixty days after notice of such initial decision is received by
the individual making such request together with the address and
telephone number of the office of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
that is closest to such individual's residence. Upon request by any
such individual or upon request by a wife, divorced wife, widow,
surviving divorced mother, surviving divorced father, husband,
divorced husband, widower, surviving divorced husband, child, or
parent who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights may be
prejudiced by any decision the Commissioner of Social Security has
rendered, the Office of Hearings and Appeals shall give such
applicant and such other individual reasonable notice and opportunity
for a hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C.
§§ 551 et seq.] with respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held,
shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify,
or reverse the Commissioner's findings of fact and such initial
decision. The Commissioner of Social Security shall deliver the
complete files of appealed cases to the office designated by the
Office of Hearings and Appeals within ten days of its receipt of a
notice from the Office of Hearings and Appeals that such an
individual has filed an appeal. An Administrative Law Judge
appointed by the Chief Judge of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act to hear matters under
the Social Security Act shall hear, and make a determination upon,
any proceeding instituted before the Office of Hearings and Appeals
and any motion in connection therewith, assigned to such
Administrative Law Judge by the Chief Judge, and shall make a
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decision which constitutes his final disposition of the proceedings.
An Administrative Law Judge shall not be assigned to prepare a
recommended decision under the Social Security Act. An
Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Chief Judge of the Office
of Hearings and Appeals is not required to give any deference to the
Commissioner's findings of fact and such initial decision. Any such
request with respect to such initial decision must be filed with the
Office of Hearings and Appeals within sixty days after notice of such
initial decision is sent by the Commissioner of Social Security to the
individual making such request. The Commissioner of Social
Security is further authorized, on the Commissioner's own motion, to
hold such hearings and to conduct such investigations and other
proceedings as the Commissioner may deem necessary or proper for
the administration of this title [42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.], but in no
event has the authority to issue a final decision on an application for
a payment under this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.] or review the
findings of fact, a final decision or other order issued by the Office of
Hearings and Appeals. The Social Security Administration shall be
bound by the orders and final decisions of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals. In the course of any hearing, investigation or other
proceeding, the Commissioner and the Office of Hearings and
Appeals may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses
and receive evidence. Evidence may be received at any hearing
before the Commissioner of Social Security or the Office of Hearings
and Appeals even though inadmissible under the rules of evidence
applicable to court procedure." 249
Amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), regarding the Title XVI
supplemental security income program, and 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b),
regarding the Title XVII health insurance for the aged and disabled
(Medicare) program, to conform with the above Title II amendments
also would be necessary.
249. Social Security Act, § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (2003).
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EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER FINAL DECISIONS OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT BENEFITS CLAIMS
The authority to make final administrative decisions on Social
Security Act claims will be transferred from the SSA Commissioner
and DHHS Secretary, and vested exclusively in the USOHA. The
jurisdiction of the new department will be exclusive as the final two
administrative steps that must be exhausted before an appeal may be
taken by a claimant to the District Court. However, the SSA
Commissioner and DHHS Secretary retain all authority for all of the
policy-making, policy-implementation, rulemaking, investigation and
prosecutorial functions vested in the SSA and DHHS by law. The
USOHA will perform the appellate adjudicatory functions of the SSA
OHA that currently are performed at both the ALJ and SSA Appeals
Council levels for the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
program under Social Security Act Title 11,250 the supplemental
security income program under Title XVI,251 at both the ALJ and
DHHS Medicare Appeals Council levels for the Medicare program
(health insurance for the aged and disabled program) under XVIII252
and at the AU level for any other program or class of cases that the
USOHA hears pursuant to its permissive jurisdiction.
The USOHA will have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all
claims arising from the Title II and Title XVI programs after the
initial denial, in whole or in part, by the SSA, and all benefits claims
arising from Title XVIII after the initial denial, in whole or in part,
by the DHHS. The permissive jurisdiction of the USOHA also will
include the entire Social Security Act and the APA, the latter of
which authorizes ALHs to hear all adjudications covered by the
APA, so that the new department can hear other classes of cases
without needing new legislation. The APA provides that "[a]n
agency as defined by section 551 of this title which occasionally or
temporarily is insufficiently staffed with administrative law judges
appointed under section 3105 of this title may use administrative law
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., but particularly 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2003).
251.42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., but particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1383.
252. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq., but particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff and
1395ii.
356 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
judges selected by the Office of Personnel Management from and
with the consent of other agencies. 253  The jurisdiction must be
broadly stated, since, in the past, SSA ALJs were called upon to hear
Black Lung and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation cases, and
may be called upon to hear other classes of cases in the future, as
they now hear Medicare cases.
The purpose of the USOHA becoming a new agency separate
from the SSA and DHHS is to divorce the appellate adjudicatory
function from the conflicting functions of making SSA and DHHS
policy and enforcing the policy through investigations and
prosecutorial steps. A decision of the new USOHA would be the
final administrative decision of Social Security Act benefits claims,
and would not be reviewed by the SSA or DHHS. The USOHA
decisions are for the parties, rather than just on behalf of the SSA
Commissioner or DHHS Secretary.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the new department will be limited
to appeals as of right from all benefits claims arising from the Social
Security Act after DDS consideration of the claims on behalf of the
SSA or Medicare Intermediary consideration of the claims on behalf
of the DHHS. An appeal to the USOHA will be the claimant's right
after an initial determination by, or on behalf of, the SSA or DHHS
that partly or wholly denies the claim.
The hearing before a USOHA ALJ will be a de novo proceeding.
E. Final Administrative Appellate Review by the United States
Office of Hearings and Appeals
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE
APPELLATE REVIEW BY THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF
HEARINGS AND APPEALS
The Chief Judge shall establish a Social Security Appellate Panel
Service in each region composed only of ALJs in the hearing offices
in each region who are appointed for a period of years by the Chief
Judge to hear and determine appeals taken from AU decisions issued
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 1383(c), and 1395(b). ALJs who
are appointed to a Social Security Appellate Panel Service by the
253. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1996).
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Chief Judge shall be appointed and may be reappointed. The Chief
Judge shall designate a sufficient number of such panels so that
appeals may be heard and disposed of expeditiously. Multi-region
panels may be established to meet the needs of small regions. An
appeal under this section shall be assigned to a panel of three
members of a Social Security Appellate Panel Service, except that a
member of such service may not hear an appeal originating in the
hearing office which is the member's permanent duty station or the
hearing office where the member is on a temporary detail
assignment.
EXPLAINATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: FINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE APPELLATE REVIEW BY THE UNITED
STATES OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
The USOHA will have a two tier appellate process: first, a
decision after a hearing by an ALJ, and then an appeal to a local
panel of three ALJs akin to the Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panel
model. The Appellate Panels will be required to give deference to
the individual ALJs' decisions, if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record, as is stated in part VIII(F). 54 This proposal is
modeled in principle on the Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panel
statute.
2 55
The Bankruptcy Court Appellate Panels were made permissive,
not mandatory, and thus are not used in all Circuits, because of a
Constitutional issue whether the use of the Panels is an improper
delegation of Article III court jurisdiction over private rights in
bankruptcy from the District Courts. Bankruptcy Court Appellate
Panel review is a substitute for District Court review only upon all
parties' consent and appeals go directly to the regional Circuit Courts
of Appeals. Because there is no Constitutional jurisdiction issue for
administrative cases involving entitlement to public rights that were
created by statute, such as administrative determinations of
entitlement to Social Security Act benefits, the Bankruptcy Court
Appellate Panel model may be modified to make it mandatory for
254. See infra text accompanying notes 273-278.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1993).
358 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
Social Security Act benefits cases.256
The appellate panel system is one of the key features that makes
the self-governing AU model superior to the current structure and
commission model in providing high quality service and decisions
for the claimants. The Bankruptcy Court system is another
nationwide network of tribunals that hears a high volume of cases in
a specialized area that are generated mostly from individual
petitioners. There are ninety-two Bankruptcy Courts situated in
proximity to the District Courts.25 7 There are 140 Social Security
hearing offices. 8  Over 1,500,000 cases were filed in Bankruptcy
Court in 2002.259 As is stated above, over 500,000 cases are brought
before Social Security ALJs every year. Accordingly, Social
Security claimants can benefit from the use of an appellate system
that has proven to work on a large scale.
In addition to being an appellate system that can handle a large
caseload, the appellate panel system has several other benefits that
would afford timely, high quality service to the Social Security
claimants and Medicare beneficiaries and providers and likely reduce
the requests for judicial review:
1. First and foremost, appellate panel decisions result in higher
quality decisions. A survey of bankruptcy practitioners revealed
that two-thirds of them believed that the appellate panel decisions
were "better products" than District Court decisions.260
256. Thalia L. Downing Carroll, Why Practicality Should Trump Technicality:
A Brief Argument for the Precedential Value of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Decisions, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (2000); Hon. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense
of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
137 (1997); Tisha Morris, The Establishment of Bankruptcy Panels Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Historical Background and Sixth Circuit Analysis,
26 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1501 (1996); Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1995).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2003).
258. See Social Security Online, available at
http://ftp.ssa.gov/oha/hearing-process.html.
259. Judicial Facts and Figures of the United States Courts: 1988-2002, Table
5.1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table5. l.htm.
260. Wiseman, supra note 256, at 7.
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2. The confidence in the high quality of the appellate panel
decisions by the bankruptcy bar has resulted in less than half as
many appeals to the Circuit Courts as there are from District
Court decisions. 26' In the Ninth Circuit in 1987, only 10% of
appellate panel decisions were appealed compared to 25% of the
District Court decisions. 262 Also, appellate panel decisions are
reversed at the Circuit Court- level less often than District Court
decisions. 263  Thus, appellate panels substantially reduce the
federal courts caseload, whichi reflects a higher degree of decision
accuracy.
3. Appellate panels have a short average disposition time, which
was only 75 days in the Ninth Circuit in 1994.264
4. Appellate panels afford access by the claimants, Medicare
beneficiaries, and providers to a local appellate process.
5. The large pool of over 1,000 ALJs permits the timely
determination of appeals, which has not occurred with the SSA
Appeals Council, as stated above in part Ill(C). Timely and high
quality review cannot occur with a commission, which likely will
not have more than twelve members and would have to resort to
hiring SSA Appeals Council-type reviewers to handle the
caseload.
6. Appellate panel work fosters the development of expertise by the
panel members, which leads to better decisions. 265
7. The opportunity for appellate work increases judges' morale and
is viewed by judges as an honor and an opportunity to "improve
judicial service to the litigants." 266
261. Morris, supra note 256, at 1509, 1517-19 (citing, Final Report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee, 74-76 (1990); Wiseman, supra note 256, at 7).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Morris, supra note 256, at 1530.
265. Id. at 1509 (citing, Final Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee,
74-75 (1990)).
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8. Although the panel work would increase the workload of the
ALJs, and thus additional judges likely will be required and
additional travel and other administrative costs incurred, 267 given
the elimination of the Appeals Council, with its staff of 27 AAJs
and over 800 support personnel and substantial facilities, 268 and
the elimination of the DHHS Medicare Appeals Council, the
costs for the appellate panels, which can meet in already
established local facilities, likely will be less than the cost of the
two Appeals Councils. The SSA Fiscal Year 2000 Annual
Performance Plan states that the annual cost of the Office of
Appellate Operations, which includes the SSA Appeals Council,
was $575 million.269 The SSA Fiscal Year 2000 Performance
and Accountability Report states that the unit cost for the SSA
Appeals Council to hear a case is $440.270 Since the SSA
Appeals Council processed 146,980 appeals in fiscal year 2000,
the cost of the SSA Appeals Council process apparently was
$64,671,200 in fiscal year 2000.271 Thus, unlike the Bankruptcy
Court Appellate Panel Service, which was a new process in
addition to the appellate step that already was available, the
Social Security Appellate Panel Service is replacing a failed
appellate review step that already exists and is funded.
Thus, in summary, based upon the Bankruptcy Court experience,
the appellate panel model (1) is an appellate system that can handle a
large caseload, (2) results in higher quality decisions because of
expertise, (3) results in substantially fewer appeals to the courts and a
substantially lower reversal rate by the courts because of the bar's
and courts' confidence in the high quality of the decisions, which
reflects a higher degree of decision accuracy from three expert
266. Id. (quoting, Federal Courts Study Commission, Working Papers and
Subcommittee Reports, Vol. 1, 364 (1990)).
267. Id. at 1512-13, 1520-22.
268. See Social Security Online, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oha/aboutac.html.
269. SSA Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan 35, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/app/00appfin.htm#WorldClass.
270. Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance and Accountability Report 119,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/finance/fy00acctrep.pdf.
271. Id.
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decisionmakers working together, (4) results in a substantially
reduced federal court caseload, (5) results in a shorter disposition
time because the large pool of about 1,000 ALJs permits the timely
determination of appeals that cannot take place with a small body
such as the SSA Appeals Council or a Commission, and (6) affords
the claimants access to a local appellate process.
A final point that should be considered is whether the appellate
panel decisions should be given precedential value by the individual
ALJs sitting in either the hearing office or entire region where the
appeal originated. 272 However, the policy-making authority of the
SSA and DHHS cannot be usurped.
F. Final Level of Administrative Review, Finality of Decision,
Limitations on Review of Decisions
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: FINAL LEVEL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW, FINALITY OF DECISION,
LIMITATIONS ON REVIEW OF DECISIONS
The authority to make final administrative decisions of Social
Security Act benefits claims is transferred from the SSA
Commissioner and DHHS Secretary and vested exclusively in the
U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals. A decision of the U.S. Office
of Hearings and Appeals cannot be reviewed by the SSA, SSA
Commissioner, DHHS or DHHS Secretary, or any component of the
SSA or DHHS. However, the SSA Commissioner and DHHS
Secretary retain all authority for all of the policy-making, policy-
implementation, rulemaking, investigation and prosecutorial
functions vested in the SSA and DHHS by law, including the final
administrative decision-making authority of the DHHS Secretary
over Medicare, Medicaid and other federal health care enforcement
proceedings brought under the Social Security Act and other
applicable statutes.
Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) of the Social Security Act shall
be amended as follows: "The findings and decisions of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals after a hearing shall be binding upon all
individuals and agencies who were parties to such hearing. The
272. Downing Carroll, supra note 256, at 571-77.
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decision of the Administrative Law Judge shall become the final
decision of the Office of Hearings and Appeals 60 days after its
issuance to the parties unless, within such period, a request for
administrative review with respect to such decision of the
Administrative Law Judge is filed with the Office of Hearings and
Appeals and an Office of Hearings and Appeals Appellate Panel has
directed that such decision shall be reviewed by an Office of
Hearings and Appeals Appellate Panel [and either of the following
occur: (1) the Office of Hearings and Appeals Appellate Panel
subsequently either modifies or reverses the decision on the merits,
which becomes the final decision of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals, or vacates the decision and remands it to the Administrative
Law Judge for further proceedings, or, (2) upon a denial of a request
for review by an Office of Hearings and Appeals Appellate Panel,
there is judicial review of the decision that does not result in an
affirmance of the denial of a request for review by the Office of
Hearings and Appeals Appellate Panel]. The findings of the
Administrative Law Judge as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. An Office of Hearings and Appeals
Appellate Panel must affirm a decision of the Administrative Law
Judge unless the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or
there was a material error of law or abuse of discretion, or material
new evidence exists and good cause is shown for the failure to
incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. No
findings of fact or decision of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal or governmental agency
except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the
Office of Hearings and Appeals, or any officer or employee thereof
shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28, United
States Code [28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 1346], to recover on any claim
arising under this title [42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.] ' 273
273. Modeled on 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2003).
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EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: FINAL LEVEL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW, FINALITY OF DECISION,
LIMITATIONS ON REVIEW OF DECISIONS
The authority to make final administrative decisions on Social
Security Act benefits claims will be transferred from the SSA
Commissioner and DHHS Secretary and vested exclusively in the
USOHA. A decision of the USOHA is final and cannot be reviewed
by the SSA, SSA Commissioner, DHHS Secretary, or DHHS, or any
component of the SSA or DHHS. A USOHA decision will be
subject only to the judicial review specified in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
However, the SSA Commissioner and DHHS Secretary retain all
authority for all of the policy-making, policy-implementation,
rulemaking, investigation and prosecutorial functions vested in the
SSA and DHHS by law, including the final administrative decision-
making authority of the DHHS Secretary over Medicare, Medicaid
and other federal health care enforcement proceedings brought under
the Social Security Act and other applicable statutes.
What is a "final decision" of a Social Security Act benefit claim
now will be defined by the statute. The bracketed add-on to the
definition of a final decision goes beyond the definitions used in the
OSHRC and FMSHRC statutes and expressly leaves the AU
decision as the final decision when it is affirmed by the last level of
administrative review or upon judicial review.
As the Supreme Court stated in Sims v. Apfel, the Social Security
Act does not define what is "final decision" of the SSA
Commissioner. 274 Based upon the SSA regulations, the SSA AUs'
decisions are not the final decisions of SSA for the purposes of
exhaustion of remedies, unless a claimant requests review of the
decision by the SSA Appeals Council and the Appeals Council
denies the request for review. If the Appeals Council grants the
request for review, then its decision is the final decision of the
Commissioner. Either way, a claimant must seek Appeals Council
Review in order to exhaust his administrative remedies and be
allowed to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's decision,
unless the SSA waives the requirements of taking all administrative
274. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), (g) (2002).
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steps. 275 However, a final decision for the purposes of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the concomitant entitlement to
administrative review is not the same thing as an AU's capacity to
render a final decision of his agency on the merits, which was the key
in Landry.276 SSA regulations clearly state that all of the SSA AUs'
decisions are the final decisions of the SSA Commissioner on the
merits unless (1) the Appeals Council grants review of the case, (2)
the Appeals Council denies review and the claimant seeks judicial
review, (3) the decision is reopened and revised by an AU or the
Appeals Council under the procedure stated in 20 C.F.R.§ 404.987,
(4) the expedited appeals process is used, (5) the decision is a
recommended decision for the Appeals Council, or (6) the Appeals
Council assumes jurisdiction pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984 over a
case remanded by a federal court.277 Less than 20% of SSA AU
decisions are appealed to the Appeals Council and the last four
exceptions are uncommon occurrences. Thus, most of the SSA AU
decisions become the final decisions of the Commissioner on the
merits.
G. Judicial Review of Titles II, XVI and XVIII Benefits
Adjudications
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TITLES II,
XVI, AND XVIII BENFITS ADJUDICATIONS
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TITLE II ADJUDICATIONS: The
provisions of subsection (g) of section 205 of the Social Security Act
[42 U.S.C. § 405(g)] shall be amended to change any and all
references therein to the Commissioner of Social Security to the U.S.
Office of Hearings and Appeals.278 Otherwise, the provisions remain
the same.
275. Id. at 106-107 (citing, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(b), 404.900(a)(4)-(5),
404.955, 404.981 (1987)).
276. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128-34.
277. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (1989).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2002).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TITLE XVI ADJUDICATIONS: 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) shall be amended to read "The final
determination of the U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals after a
hearing under paragraph (1) shall be subject to judicial review as
provided in section 205(g) [42 U.S.C. § 405(g)] to the same extent as
the U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals' final determinations under
section 205 [42 U.S.C. § 405]. "279
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TITLE XVIII ADJUDICATIONS: The
Medicare statute regarding judicial review, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1),
similarly shall be amended to conform to the changes made regarding
Titles II and XVI.280
EXPLANATIONS OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF TITLES II, XVI, AND XVIII BENFITS
ADJUDICATIONS
The changes in the judicial review sections of Titles II, XVI and
XVIII are necessary to reflect the fact that only USOHA will be
making final decisions under the Social Security Act. No substantive
changes in the judicial review process are made.
The appellate review of the USOHA's final decisions will
continue to be subject to the substantial evidence standard that is set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act.281
The first step in the judicial review of final decisions by USOHA
will remain with the District Court for the judicial district where the
claimant resides or works or where the Medicare beneficiary or
provider is located. Although the initial judicial review from the
specialized boards and commissions often is performed by a federal
circuit level court, i.e., the Federal Circuit or D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, a District Court appeal step is essential for several practical
reasons:
1. It is desirable to retain local access to the judicial review process
for the members of the public who file Social Security benefits
279. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (1999).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1) (2000).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2002).
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claims, since they often do not have the funds or wherewithal to
travel to Washington, D.C., and retain counsel to represent them
far from home.
2. Social Security claimants have come to rely on the availability of
District Court judicial review, which always has been a part of
the due process for Social Security cases. Therefore, taking it
away would be perceived by the claimants and their advocacy
groups as a diminishment in due process. In the past, the
claimants' advocacy groups have spoken forcefully against
eliminating District Court judicial review as a reduction in the
claimants' access to due process. High quality service and due
process for the claimants requires the availability of locally
accessible judicial review.
3. The huge size of the Social Security appellate caseload would
overwhelm the Circuit Courts if the District Court step is
removed. As of September 30, 2001, and September 30, 2002,
the national numbers of Social Security cases filed in the District
Courts during the preceding year were 17,074 and 18,322,
respectively. Title II and Title XVI claims made up over 99% of
the cases in 2001 and 2002.282 During the year ending September
30, 2002, only 1,748 cases of all types combined were filed with
the Federal Circuit. 283 During the year ending September 30,
2002, only 1,126 cases of all types combined were filed with the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 284 Thus, the caseload for either of
these Circuit Courts would increase exponentially if the District
Court review were eliminated. The caseload problem is not
resolved by limiting judicial review to the regional Circuit Courts
instead of the Federal Circuit or D.C. Circuit. During the year
ending September 30, 2002, only 777 Social Security cases were
282. Medicare Part A and Black Lung case appeals were the remaining .5
percent. Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2002 Annual Reports of the
Director at Table S-9, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/contents.html; Judicial Business of the United
States Courts: 2001 Annual Reports of the Director, Table S-9, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/contents.html.
283. Judicial Business, 2002 Report, Id. at Table B-8.
284. Id. at Table B.
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filed with regional Circuit Courts of Appeals.28 5 This means that
less than 5% of the cases that go to the District Court level find
their way to the Circuit Courts. Adding as many as 17,000 to
18,000 Social Security cases to the regional Circuit Courts would
increase their workload by over 35%, given that 47,068 cases
were filed in 2002 in the regional Circuit Courts.286 Elimination
of District Court review of Social Security cases reasonably
would cause the Judicial Conference to become concerned that
the Circuit Courts will be inundated with Social Security cases.
4. Congress has a demonstrated preference for local control and
decisionmaking with Social Security benefits programs.
5. Retaining District Court judicial review will keep local decisional
generalists in the appeals chain who are sensitive to due process
violations and assuring due process for the claimants, including
adherence to the APA in all respects.
The appeals from the District Courts will remain with the
regional Circuit Courts of Appeal, as they are now, rather than being
transferred to the D.C. Circuit or the Federal Circuit. Even with
District Court review, placing all of the Social Security Circuit-level
appeals in either of these courts would increase their workload by
over 50%. Also, keeping appellate review in the regional Circuit
Courts allows regional access to the claimants and Medicare
beneficiaries and providers. Both appeals from Bankruptcy Court
decisions, after District Court review, and Tax Court decisions are
appealed to the regional Circuits, which makes sense since the
Bankruptcy and Tax Courts also serve individual claimants
throughout the country who often have limited means. (Although the
Tax Court is based in Washington, D.C., it sits throughout the
country.)
285. Id. at Table B-1A.
286. Judicial Business, 2002 Report, supra note 282, at Table B.
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H. Chief Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Chief Administrative
Law Judges, Duties
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE, DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES,
DUTIES
There shall be in the U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals a Chief
Administrative Law Judge who is referred to in this Title as the
"Chief Judge." The Chief Judge shall be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the
persons who are Administrative Law Judges employed by the U.S.
Office of Hearings and Appeals and who, by reason of training,
education, or experience, including at least five years of experience
as an Administrative Law Judge within the Office of Hearings and
Appeals and/or Social Security Administration [and/or Department of
Health and Human Services, if the ALJ function for Medicare cases
already is transferred to that agency], are qualified to carry out the
functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals pursuant to this Act.
The Chief Judge shall be compensated at the rate provided for
level AL-1 for Administrative Law Judge positions pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 5372.
The Chief Judge shall be appointed for a term of six years and
may be reappointed for one additional term. In any case in which a
successor does not take office at the end of a Chief Judge's term of
office, the Chief Judge may continue in office until the entry to office
of the successor. At the end of the Chief Judge's service as the
Chief Judge, he or she is entitled to return to active duty employment
as an Administrative Law Judge employed by the Office of Hearings
and Appeals.
The Chief Judge shall be responsible on behalf of the Office of
Hearings and Appeals for the administrative operations of the Office
of Hearings and Appeals.
The Chief Judge may assign duties, and delegate, or authorize
successive re-delegations of authority to act and to render decisions,
to such Administrative Law Judges, officers and employees of the
Office of Hearings and Appeals as the Chief Judge may find
necessary. Within the limitations of such delegations, re-delegations,
or assignments, all official acts and decisions of such Administrative
Law Judges, officers and employees shall have the same force and
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effect as though performed or rendered by the Chief Judge.
However, the Chief Judge may not delegate the duty to appoint
officers and Administrative Law Judges.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act regarding the transfer of
officers and employees from the SSA OHA, the Chief Judge shall
appoint such officers and employees as are necessary to carry out the
functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals and shall fix their
compensation in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and
subchapter III of chapter 53 of Title 5, United States Code [5 U.S.C.
§§ 5101 et seq. and 5331 et seq.], relating to classification and
General Schedule pay rates and the provisions relating to
classification and Senior Executive Service [5 U.S.C. § 5382] and
Executive Level pay rates [5 U.S.C. §§ 5312 et seq]. Except as
otherwise provided in this Act regarding the transfer of
Administrative Law Judges from the Social Security Administration
Office of Hearings and Appeals [and Department of Health and
Human Services, if the ALI function for Medicare cases already is
transferred to that agency], the Chief Judge shall appoint as many
Administrative Law Judges as are necessary to carry out the
functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals including the
proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections
556 and 557 of Title 5, and shall take personnel actions regarding
Administrative Law Judges, including but not limited to assignment
and removal, in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, sections 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E), 5335(a)(B),
5372 and 7521 of Title 5, United States Code. Upon the effective
date of the legislation that creates the Office of Hearings and
Appeals, the Administrative Law Judges assigned to the Office of
Hearings and Appeals of the Social Security Administration [and
Department of Health and Human Services, if the ALJ function for
Medicare cases already is transferred to that agency] shall be
transferred automatically in grade and position to the Office of
Hearings and Appeals.
There shall be in the Office of Hearings and Appeals a Principal
Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge, who is referred to in this
Title as the "Principal Deputy Chief Judge," and five Deputy Chief
Administrative Law Judges, who are referred to in this Title as the
"Deputy Chief Judges." The Principal Deputy Chief Judge shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, from among the persons who are Administrative Law Judges
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employed by the Office of Hearings and Appeals and who, by reason
of training, education, or experience, including at least five years of
experience as an Administrative Law Judge within the Office of
Hearings and Appeals and/or Social Security Administration [and/or
Department of Health and Human Services, if the AU function for
Medicare cases already is transferred to that agency], are qualified to
carry out the functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
pursuant to this Act. The Chief Judge shall recommend a candidate
for Principal Deputy Chief Judge as a Schedule C appointment to the
President. The Chief Judge will appoint the Deputy Chief Judges
from among the persons who are Administrative Law Judges
employed by the Office of Hearings and Appeals and who, by reason
of training, education, or experience, including at least five years of
experience as an Administrative Law Judge within the Office of
Hearings and Appeals and/or Social Security Administration [and/or
Department of Health and Human Services, if the AU function for
Medicare cases already is transferred to that agency], are qualified to
carry out the functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
pursuant to this Act.
The Principal Deputy Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judges shall
be compensated at the rate provided for level AL-2 for
Administrative Law Judge positions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5372.
The Principal Deputy Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judges shall
be appointed for a term of six years and may be reappointed for one
additional term. In any case in which a successor does not take office
at the end of a Principal Deputy Chief Judge's or Deputy Chief
Judge's term of office, the Principal Deputy Chief Judge or Deputy
Chief Judge may continue in office until the entry upon office of the
successor. At the end of the Principal Deputy Chief Judge's or
Deputy Chief Judge's service as the Principal Deputy Chief Judge or
Deputy Chief Judge, he or she is entitled to return to active duty
employment as an Administrative Law Judge employed by the Office
of Hearings and Appeals.
The Principal Deputy Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judges shall
perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Chief Judge
shall from time to time assign or delegate. The Principal Deputy
Chief Judge shall be the Acting Chief Judge of the Office of Hearings
and Appeals during the absence or disability of the Chief Judge or in
the event of a vacancy in the office of Chief Judge.
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EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, DEPUTY CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, DUTIES
The field of candidates for the Chief Judge, Principal Deputy
Chief Judge, and Deputy Chief Judge positions is limited to actively
employed ALJs in USOHA with significant Social Security Act
benefits claims adjudication experience to ensure that only highly
qualified candidates with experience relevant to supervising an
adjudicative body staffed by ALJs are considered for the positions.
Several Deputy Chief Judges are necessary to administer the field
offices of the new department because, as is stated in part VIII(I), the
regional OHA offices would be replaced by one central
administrative office to reap substantial cost savings and an increase
in operational efficiency. 28
7
The Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judge are the principal
officers of USOHA. They would be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and have the authority to
appoint and hire all employees, including inferior officers and the
ALJs. ALJs must be directly appointed by the Chief Judge because
the issue of whether ALJs are inferior officers was raised in Landry.
(Under Title 5, an employee who is appointed or hired by a person
without authority is not a federal employee.) As is stated in part
VIII(B), the ALT in Landry was found to be not an inferior officer
because he did not have the power to issue final decisions for his
agency.288 However, as is stated in parts VIII(B) and (F), the Landry
decision does not resolve the inferior officer/Appointment Clause
issue for the SSA ALJs, because they do make final decisions for the
SSA Commissioner. 289
The USOHA can avoid the inferior officer/Appointments Clause
issue simply by having the agency head directly appoint the ALJs.
The provision that "the Chief Judge shall appoint as many
Administrative Law Judges as are necessary to carry out the
functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals including the
287. See infra text accompanying notes 293-294.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 235-247. My article regarding this
issue is forthcoming.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 235-247, 274-277
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proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections
556 and 557 of [Title 5]" is the same as the provision in the APA that
each agency shall appoint as many ALJs as are needed to conduct the
required proceedings.290
As a necessary result of the applicability of the APA to Social
Security Act adjudications, the proposal expressly retains the status
of the SSA ALJs who are transferred to the new department, and
ALJs to be appointed by the new department in the future, as ALJs
appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105 of the APA.
The other provisions regarding the offices of Chief Judge,
Principal Deputy Chief Judge, and Deputy Chief Judge, such as terms
of office and scope of authority, are included to strengthen their
positions as the administrators of the USOHA and protectors of the
independence of the adjudication function.
I. Removal
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: REMOVAL
The Chief Administrative Law Judge and Principal Deputy Chief
Administrative Law Judge may be removed by the President, after
notice and opportunity for a public hearing, only for inefficiency,
ineligibility, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, or if the
President finds the Chief Administrative Law Judge or Principal
Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge guilty of appointing or
promoting an official or employee on the basis of a political test or
qualification, but for no other cause. If the Chief Administrative Law
Judge or Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge is removed, the
removal is only from the position of Chief Administrative Law Judge
or Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge, not from the officer's
position as an Administrative Law Judge employed by the Office of
Hearings and Appeals.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: REMOVAL
The proposed agency will not be under the direction and control
290. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2000).
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of the President or any other Executive Branch official outside of the
new agency. Therefore, in the absence of cause, the President may
not remove the head of an agency that is not under his direction and
control. Restricting the President's ability to arbitrarily remove the
appointed principal officers is a primary characteristic of an
independent agency, so that the officers are not subject to "at will"
removal for political or other reasons.29'
The provision is modeled on similar provisions of nearly twenty
independent agencies, and includes all four grounds for removal that
appear in the provisions. Examples include the U.S. Tax Court,292
OSHRC, 293 FMSHRC,294 and the SSA.295 The requirement of notice
and an opportunity for a public hearing is modeled on the removal
provision for U.S. Tax Court Judges. 296 Over one dozen independent
agencies' statutes have no removal provision, but Supreme Court
rulings bar removal of "members of a body created to exercise purely
adjudicatory functions that are not subject to review by any other
executive branch official. 297
J. Maintenance and Organization of Field Offices
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: MAINTENANCE AND
ORGANIZATION OF FIELD OFFICES
The U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals will maintain a
sufficient number of local permanent field offices throughout the
United States to conduct the business of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals. All field offices in existence on the effective date of this
Act shall remain and become a part of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals. The Regional OHA offices and position of Regional Chief
Administrative Law Judge will be abolished.
291. Garcia, supra note 81, at CRS- 1.
292. 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2000).
293. 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2000).
294. 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(1)(B) (2000).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2000). Only the Tennessee Valley Authority
allows removal for political impropriety. Garcia, supra note 81, at CRS-4, n. 11.
296. 26 U.S.C. § 7442(f) (2000).
297. Garcia, supra note 81, at CRS-3-CRS-5.
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EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR:
MAINTENANCE AND ORGANIZATION OF FIELD OFFICES
The policy of affording claimants and Medicare beneficiaries and
providers access to local hearings for their appeals must be
continued, since many claimants and beneficiaries cannot afford to
travel far to press their claims.
Centralizing the structure of the new department by replacing the
ten regional offices and Regional Chief ALJs with one administrative
office will save money. The several Deputy Chief Judges can
perform the administrative duties of the Regional Chiefs. There will
be fewer administrators, and only one support staff and set of offices
at the department headquarters, instead of ten support staffs and
offices in addition to the headquarters' staff and offices. A
centralized structure also will eliminate inconsistencies in
administration and policy implementation, which has been a problem
with the regional SSA OHA offices. In addition, having one central
office will create a more efficient organization, in view of instant
modern electronic communications such as e-mail and fax.
In 1993, when the ten regional SSA OHA offices employed about
250 people, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that
eliminating the regional offices would reduce spending by about $12
million annually for salaries and benefits and about $ 1 million
annually for leasing CoStS. 298 The ten regional SSA OHA offices
employed about 230 people in 200, not counting the decision writer
units that are stationed in the regional offices 29 9 which is slightly less
than the number employed in 1993. The savings now would most
likely be greater than $13 million annually, since salary and benefits
levels and leasing costs in the major cities where the regional offices
are located have all risen substantially since 1993.
298. Rep. of the Cong. Budget Office Dir. to Sen. Howell Heflin regarding S.
486, 103rd Cong. (April 19, 1993). S. 486 was the Administrative Law Judge
Corps Act.
299. SSA OHA Field Staff Guide (Nov. 2000).
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K. Rulemaking, Admission to Practice
PROPOSED TERMS: RULEMAKING, ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE
RULEMAKING: The U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals has
the exclusive power to prescribe such rules of practice and procedure
and other regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate to carry
out the functions of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, which will
be promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553. The Chief Judge will
promulgate rules of practice and procedure and other regulations only
after consultation with the AJ force in the agency. Such rules of
practice, procedure and other regulations shall be consistent with
those set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. The Office of
Hearings and Appeals shall not have the authority to issue rules
regarding the policies or administration of the Social Security Act
programs that are the province of the SSA Commissioner or DHHS
Secretary under the Social Security Act.
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE: The U.S. Office of Hearings and
Appeals may regulate the admission of individuals to practice before
it, but no qualified person shall be denied admission to practice
before the Office of Hearings and Appeals because of his or her
failure to be a member of any profession or calling.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR:
RULEMAKING, ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
An adjudicative agency cannot be truly independent if the agency
from which it hears appeals has control of its procedure and rules.
Once the new USOHA exists and its rules are issued, the portions of
the SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals Hearings, Appeals and
Litigation Law Manual ("HALLEX") and the SSA regulations that
deal with appellate administrative procedure beyond the APA
provisions will no longer be in effect or controlled by SSA.
However, the SSA HALLEX and regulations regarding appellate
administrative procedure should be kept in effect by the USOHA
until its rules and regulations are in effect.
As an independent agency, USOHA also requires the authority to
issue regulations regarding its self-administration. However,
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USOHA will not have authority to issue rules regarding the policies
or administration of the Social Security Act programs, which are the
province of the SSA and DHHS. Since the proposal does not require
the new agency to provide an opportunity for a hearing on the record
in order to issue rules, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57, which set forth the
requirements for adjudications, will not apply to the new agency's
limited rule making power.
The proposed provisions governing rules of practice and who
may practice before the new agency are similar to those in the
STB300 , OSHRC3' and Tax Court legislation.3 °2
Included in the procedural choices that the new entity may make
in its discretion are whether hearings and other proceeding before the
new agency must be adversarial, whether and how the evidentiary
record should be closed, and whether there will be issue preclusion.
These three issues should not be addressed in the in the statute that
creates the independent adjudication agency for three reasons:
1. These issues properly should be left to the new agency's
discretion as the procedural issues that they are, just as they
have been left to SSA's and DHHS' discretion.
2. Adversarial hearings, rules precluding certain evidence,30 3
and issue preclusion are procedures that complicate what is
supposed to be a simple and speedy entitlement claims
process for disabled or elderly claimants and Medicare
beneficiaries, a significant minority of whom still do not use
representation to help press their claims.
3. These issues are controversial and will raise dissention and
distraction that may cause the parties that would be interested
in establishing an independent adjudication agency for Social
Security Act claims to lose sight of its overriding purpose: to
300. 49 U.S.C. § 703(e) (2000).
301. 29 U.S.C. § 661(g) (2000).
302. 26 U.S.C. § 7452-7453 (2000).
303. SSA regulations currently do not close or limit the record at any point in
the administrative adjudication process. Even at the final step of administrative
review, the SSA Appeals Council engages in plenary review unless it says to the
contrary. Sims, 530 U.S. 103 at 111 (citing, 20 C.F.R. § 404.976(a) (1999)).
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provide claimants and Medicare beneficiaries and providers
with timely, high quality and fair decisions of their claims
from adjudicators who are independent of the agency that
initially decided their claims.
Whether the hearings before the ALJs and proceedings before the
USOHA appellate panels will be required to be adversarial, meaning
that the SSA or DHHS must have a representative present to defend
its position in order to avoid default, is a procedural issue that should
not be addressed in the new agency statute. Adversarial appellate
administrative adjudications would be a radical move away from the
spirit in which the Social Security Act benefits claims have been
heard. SSA regulations have long have stated that the agency
"conduct[s] the administrative review process in an informal, non-
adversarial manner."30 4 The new agency can decide the issue as a
matter of discretion as part of its procedural rules. Both the SSA and
the claimants' advocacy groups likely would oppose a requirement
that the hearings and proceedings be adversarial. The SSA likely
would oppose adversarial hearings because of the substantial cost of
staffing to prepare for and attend over 500,000 hearings and
proceedings per year. The advocacy groups likely would oppose
adversarial hearings because a vigorous, specific defense by the SSA
in each case may result in a reduced number of claimants receiving
benefits. The DHHS, CMS and the Medicare advocacy groups also
likely would be in opposition to adversarial hearings for similar
reasons.
However, in order to meet the requirements of due process, the
APA provides that "[a] party is entitled to appear in person or by or
with counsel or other duly qualified representative in an agency
proceeding." 30 5 Therefore, the SSA or DHHS, as a party, will have a
right to appear on its own behalf at the proceedings before the
USOHA, if it wishes to do so, and may also choose to waive its right
to appear, as SSA now does. The USOHA's decisions are for the
parties, rather than just on behalf of the SSA, DHHS or USOHA.
The purposes of separating the appellate administrative adjudication
process from SSA and DHHS is to provide more timely and higher
304. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2003).
305. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966).
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quality adjudications for the claimants and Medicare beneficiaries
and providers, not to make the process more complex and difficult
for them to negotiate.
An issue exhaustion requirement also is not appropriate, given the
informality of the hearing process for Social Security Act benefits
claims. As the Supreme Court stated in Sims, there is no statute or
regulation that requires a Social Security claimant to list the specific
issues to be considered on appeal on his request for review of an
AL's decision by the SSA Appeals Council in order to preserve
those issues for judicial review. 30 6 Although agencies often issue
"regulations to require issue exhaustion in administrative appeals, '30 7
which are enforced by the courts by not considering unexhausted
issues, "SSA regulations do not require issue exhaustion. 30 8  In
Sims, the Supreme Court refused to impose a judicially inferred issue
exhaustion requirement in order to preserve judicial review of the
issues upon a claimant for Title II and Title XVI Social Security Act
benefits. The Court reasoned that the issues in SSA hearings are not
developed in an adversarial administrative proceeding and the
"[Appeals] Council, not the claimant, has primary responsibility for
identifying and developing the issues. 309 The Court added that "we
think it likely that the Commissioner could adopt a regulation that did
require issue exhaustion." 310 Accordingly, although the statute that
creates USOHA or USOHA's regulations could require issue
exhaustion, the Supreme Court stated compelling rationales for not
requiring issue exhaustion in the absence of adversarial hearings and
proceedings. Expecting the elderly and disabled to bear the burden
of preserving specific legal issues for judicial review does not
comport with a sense of fair play and keeping the claims process
claimant-friendly.
Another issue for the new agency will be whether to have
different procedural rules for represented and unrepresented
claimants, which can permit addressing these and other procedural
306. Sims, 530 U.S. 103 at 108.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 112.
310. Id. at 108.
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issues fairly for represented claimants without burdening the
unrepresented claimants. For example, the responsibility for
obtaining and submitting evidence on the claimant's or Medicare
beneficiary's behalf likely would vary based upon legal
representation or the lack of it.
L. Transfer Mechanics
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: TRANSFER MECHANICS
All of the components of the SSA, SSA OHA, and DHHS that are
necessary to effect the adjudication of the appeals of all benefits
claims arising from the Social Security Act after denial by the SSA or
DHHS must be transferred to the USOHA. The components of SSA,
SSA OHA, DHHS and CMS that perform policy, rulemaking,
investigational and/or prosecutorial functions will remain with the
SSA and DHHS. The personnel transfers may be permissive in that
the USOHA may be permitted to choose who it wants to hire from
the SSA and DHHS, but these employees may be given the option to
stay with SSA and DHHS. However, as is stated earlier in this part,
all of the SSA ALJs (and DHHS ALJs, if the USOHA is created after
the AU function is transferred to DHHS) must be transferred to the
USOHA. The SSA administrative budget for the current fiscal year
and physical plant of the adjudicative portions of SSA OHA,
including necessary support operations, must be transferred to the
USOHA.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: TRANSFER
MECHANICS
There is no reason why operations cannot stay where they are for
now within SSA, in order to minimize any disruption of day-to-day
operations. There are many details in the effectuation of the transfer
of a portion of an agency's personnel and functions to a new agency.
The Social Security Administration has been transferred or
reorganized several times since 1950 and the statutes by which these
transfers and reorganizations have been effectuated cover the
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details. 311
M. Administrative Budget
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
The Chief Judge shall prepare an annual budget for the U.S.
Office of Hearings and Appeals, which shall be submitted by the
President to the Congress without revision, together with the
President's annual budget for the Office of Hearings and Appeals.
The Office of Hearings and Appeals shall include in the annual
budget an itemization of the amount of funds required by the Office
of Hearings and Appeals for the fiscal year covered by the budget to
support efforts to combat fraud committed by applicants and
beneficiaries. Appropriations requests for staffing and personnel of
the Office of Hearings and Appeals shall be based upon a
comprehensive work force plan, which shall be established and
revised from time to time by the Chief Judge. Appropriations for
administrative expenses of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
should be authorized to be provided on a biennial basis.
The USOHA's administrative budget for the Title II Social
Security program (the old age, survivors and disability insurance
programs), which is paid out of the Social Security Trust Funds,
expressly must be excluded from the statutory discretionary spending
caps in order for it to provide high quality service to the public. The
SSI administrative budget must be treated separately because it is
paid out of general revenues, rather than the Social Security Trust
Funds. However, the SSI administrative budget, and the Medicare
administrative budget, also expressly should be set in reference only
to USOHA's workforce, office space, and other resource needs, not
the discretionary spending caps or other artificial spending limits, in
order for it to provide high quality service to the public.
311.42 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., 3501, 3508 (2003); see History; Ancillary Laws;
and Directives under these sections.
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EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR:
ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
The degree of independence that an agency has is affected by the
degree of control that it has in preparing and submitting its budget
requests to Congress. Budget requests usually are changed by the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), but Congress can
permit agencies to submit their budgets without revision, so that the
Appropriations Committees can compare the agency budget with the
OMB revisions. The provision is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 904(b),
which sets forth the budget terms for the SSA as an independent
agency.3 12 Consideration should be made of whether OMB should be
barred from submitting revisions of the new department's budget
requests,313 as has been done for the U.S. Postal Service314 and the
U.S. International Trade Commission,3 15 so that the staffing concerns
raised by the Social Security Advisory Board can be addressed.
For the last ten years, OMB has interpreted the discretionary
spending cap laws to cover the SSA administrative budget for the
Title II programs, even though the statute does not clearly apply to
SSA's administrative budget and the administrative costs are paid out
of the Social Security Trust Funds. SSA's program budget currently
is excluded from the discretionary spending caps because the
programs it administers are entitlement programs that are established
by permanent mandatory spending statutes. It is the nature of
entitlement programs that the number of claimants, claims for
benefits, and requests for other services under the programs cannot
be controlled or known in advance. The USOHA will not require a
program budget, since the funds used to pay benefits will continue to
be controlled and disbursed by the SSA and DHHS.
Administering the disability insurance and SSI disability
programs, including running SSA OHA, takes about two-thirds of the
SSA administrative budget, because these programs require
substantially more resources to determine entitlement than do the
other Social Security programs, such as retirement and survivors
312. 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2000).
313. Garcia, supra note 81, at CRS-5-CRS-8.
314. 39 U.S.C. §§ 203, 3604 (2000).
315. 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (2000).
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benefits, and the claimants need local access to the adjudication
process. As the Social Security Advisory Board ("SSAB") has
pointed out, SSA's reduced staffing and other tight resource
constraints resulting from spending caps has limited SSA's capacity
to respond to growing and more complex workloads. In turn, this has
resulted in diminishment in the quality and timeliness of program
service to the public. 316 The number of SES positions and staff that
the USOHA will require needs to be assessed.
The SSAB was created in 1994 by the same statute that made the
SSA an independent agency to advise the SSA Commissioner on
policies related to the Title II old age, survivors and disability
insurance programs and Title XVI supplemental security income
program. 317  The SSAB's specific functions include making
recommendations regarding the quality of service that SSA provides
to the public and such other matters as the Board deems
appropriate. 318 In September 1999, the SSAB issued a report entitled
How the Social Security Administration Can Improve Its Service to
the Public, in which it recommended that:
SSA's administrative budget for Social Security, like
its program budget, should be explicitly excluded
from the statutory cap that imposes a limit on the
amount of discretionary government spending. Both
workers and employers contribute to the self-financed
Social Security system, and are entitled to receive
service that is of high quality. It is entirely
appropriate that spending for administration of Social
Security programs be set at a level that fits the needs
of Social Security's contributors and beneficiaries,
rather than an arbitrary level that fits within the
current government cap on discretionary spending. 319
316. SSAB, How the Social Security Administration Can Improve Its Service
to the Public (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.ssab.gov.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 903(a)-(b) (2000).
318. Id.
319. SSAB, supra note 305, at 3.
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The Board cogently justified its recommendation in terms of the
SSA's lack of resources to provide high quality service in running its
programs:
The most important of the agency's constraints is its
budget. Each year, the Office of Management and
Budget allocates spending levels for all agencies and
programs, including SSA's. It also gives agencies
informal guidelines as to staffing levels. The
Congress, in reviewing the budget, makes the final
determination as to the funding that SSA will have
available to administer its programs.
Over the last decade, SSA's expenses, like those of
other government agencies, have been subject to
legislated caps on discretionary spending .... SSA's
staffing resources have declined significantly over the
last 2 decades, while the agency's workload has
increased and become more complex. The agency's
tight resource constraints limit its capacity to respond
to these growing workloads.
We.. .agree that it is good policy for the agency to be
represented in as many communities as possible.
However, if SSA is to be asked to maintain the large
number of offices that it currently has, then it is
incumbent on both the Congress and the agency to
ensure that all of these offices have the resources they
need to maintain a high level of service....
Although the [discretionary spending cap] law is clear
that spending for benefits under the Social Security
program is not subject to these caps, it is ambiguous
regarding the treatment of the agency's administrative
expenses. The OMB, which has the authority to
interpret the statutory requirements, has ruled that
SSA's administrative budget should be subject to the
caps. This means that SSA is forced to compete with
other Federal agencies for scarce resources within the
spending limits defined in law.
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In addition, in 1993 the National Performance Review
("NPR") recommended significant downsizing of the
federal workforce and a significant downsizing of
supervisory staff. Based on NPR's recommendations,
OMB allocated overall staff reduction targets to
agencies and built the agencies' administrative
resource allocations based on assumed savings from
downsizing.
This process has made it difficult for SSA to meet its
workload needs. Much of its workload is externally
generated, in that the agency has no control over the
number of people who file claims or need other types
of services that the agency must provide....
[T]he Disability Insurance and SSI disability programs
...now consume two-thirds of the agency's
administrative budget. These programs require
substantially more face-to-face work and are much
more resource-intensive than the retirement and
survivors program....
SSI administrative costs should be treated separately,
as is proper in view of the fact that they are paid out of
general revenues, rather than the Social Security Trust
Funds.
Budgeting outside of the discretionary spending cap
need not lead to unrestrained spending by SSA.
Congress can continue to review and assess the
administrative needs of the agency while still
recognizing the importance and unique role it plays in
providing service to the American public.32 °
Therefore, the USOHA's administrative budget for the Social
Security programs (i.e. old age, survivors and disability insurance
programs, SSI program, and Medicare) expressly must be excluded
320. Id. at 19-20, 47-49.
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from the statutory caps that limit the amount of discretionary
government spending, as is so for the SSA program budget, so that
high quality and timely service may be provided to the claimants.
N. Direct Transmittals to Congress
PROPOSED TERMS FOR: DIRECT TRANSMITTALS TO
CONGRESS
The U.S. Office of Hearings and Appeals shall annually transmit
to the Congress and the President a report and recommendations on
its activities. The Office of Hearings and Appeals shall transmit to
Congress and the President copies of budget estimates, requests
(including personnel needs), information, legislative
recommendations, prepared testimony for Congressional hearings,
and comments on legislation. An officer of an agency, including the
OMB, may not impose conditions on or impair communications by
the Office of Hearings and Appeals with Congress, or a committee or
Member of Congress.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TERMS FOR: DIRECT
TRANSMITTALS TO CONGRESS
The degree of independence that an agency has is affected by
whether the agency must clear its communications and information
that the agency wishes to submit to Congress with OMB before
contacting Congress. 321 This provision is modeled on the provisions
for the Surface Transportation Board.322
IX. CONCLUSION
The SSAB issued a report in 2001 that called for "fundamental
change" in the policy, procedure and structure of the SSA disability
adjudication process, including the hearing and Appeals Council
321. Garcia, supra note 81, at CRS-8-CRS-9.
322. 49 U.S.C. §§ 703(g), 704 (2000).
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steps. 323 SSA has been unsuccessful in managing OHA's mammoth
appellate administrative caseload in addition to performing SSA's
many other duties. SSA also has been unable to refrain from efforts
to implement policy through the OHA adjudication process. These
failings chronically have interfered with the timeliness and quality of
the final adjudication of Social Security Act claims by OHA
adjudicators. Furthermore, in 2003, DHHS sought authority from
Congress to use alternatives to the APA AU due process procedure
for Medicare administrative appeals, which Congress rejected.
To cure these problems, this article presents a recommendation
that Congress amend the Social Security Act to create an AU-
administered independent adjudication agency that has the exclusive
jurisdiction to make the final administrative decisions of Social
Security Act benefits claims. The Social Security Act hearing and
final administrative appeal processes should be reformed by the
transfer of the authority to make final administrative adjudications of
Social Security Act benefits claims from the SSA and DHHS to a
new adjudication agency that is independent of, but within, the SSA.
This proposal would provide the members of the American public
who seek Social Security Act benefits with timely, high quality,
impartial, and fair due process hearings and decisions of their claims
under the Social Security Act and APA by AUs in an AL-run
independent agency.
323. SSAB, Charting the Future of Social Security's Disability Programs: The
Need for Fundamental Change (January 2001), available at http://www.ssab.gov.
